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security(maven): 🛡️ patch 🛡️ vulnerability [high]#190

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security(maven): 🛡️ patch 🛡️ vulnerability [high]#190
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ℹ️ Note

This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Adoption Passing Confidence
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind (source) 2.21.1 → 2.21.5 age adoption passing confidence
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core 2.21.1 → 2.21.4 age adoption passing confidence

jackson-databind has a @​JsonView bypass for unwrapped creator parameters

CVE-2026-54518 / GHSA-rcqc-6cw3-h962

More information

Details

Summary

UnwrappedPropertyHandler.processUnwrappedCreatorProperties() replays buffered JSON into creator parameters but never consults prop.visibleInView(activeView). The normal property-based creator path gates creator properties on the active view, but this unwrapped-creator replay path bypasses that check, so a constructor parameter annotated with both @JsonView(AdminView.class) and @JsonUnwrapped is populated from attacker JSON even when a more restrictive view is active.

Impact

View-restricted unwrapped creator parameters can be set from untrusted input where @JsonView is used as a write-side authorization boundary.

Affected / Patched (verified via git tag --contains)
  • 2.21 line: >= 2.21.0, < 2.21.4 -> fixed in 2.21.4 (backport 721fa07, #​5973)
  • 3.x line: >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.4 -> fixed in 3.1.4 (#​5971, d633bc0)
Severity / CWE

Maintainer: minor. Reporter: HIGH. CWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization); related CWE-284.

Credits

Omkhar Arasaratnam (@​omkhar) - finder.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

jackson-databind's renamed @​JsonIgnore'd setters can deserialize via private fields

CVE-2026-54516 / GHSA-9fxm-vc8v-hj55

More information

Details

Summary

POJOPropertiesCollector._renameProperties() allows a property with @JsonProperty("renamed") on the getter and @JsonIgnore on the setter to be renamed rather than dropped. With MapperFeature.INFER_PROPERTY_MUTATORS enabled (default), the private backing field is retained; during deserialization BeanDeserializerFactory.addBeanProps() sees hasField()==true, builds a FieldProperty, and makes the backing field writable. An attacker supplying the renamed JSON key writes the backing field directly, bypassing the @JsonIgnore on the setter.

Impact

POJOs combining a renamed getter with an ignored setter (a read-only-over-the-wire pattern) have that field silently set from attacker input (property tampering / mass assignment). Not a general gadget; no RCE.

Affected / Patched (verified via git tag --contains)
  • 2.21 line: >= 2.21.0, < 2.21.4 -> fixed in 2.21.4 (backport c3d56dd, #​5968)
  • 3.x line: >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.4 -> fixed in 3.1.4 (#​5967, e88cb17)
Severity / CWE

Maintainer: minor. Reporter: HIGH. CWE-915.

Credits

Omkhar Arasaratnam (@​omkhar) - finder.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

jackson-databind has @​JsonView bypass for setterless creator properties

CVE-2026-54517 / GHSA-5hh8-q8hv-fr38

More information

Details

Summary

In BeanDeserializer._deserializeUsingPropertyBased, the active-view (@JsonView) filter was applied only to creator properties; the regular property-buffering branch performed no prop.visibleInView(activeView) check. A change making SetterlessProperty.isMerging() return true routed setterless Collection/Map properties through this unguarded path, so a setterless collection annotated with a restricted @JsonView is populated from attacker JSON even when the active view excludes it.

Impact

View-restricted (e.g. admin-only) setterless collection/map properties can be written from untrusted JSON despite @JsonView gating — an access-control / mass-assignment bypass. No RCE or DoS.

Affected / Patched (verified via git tag --contains)
  • 2.21 line: >= 2.21.0, < 2.21.4 -> fixed in 2.21.4 (backport 94c5d21, #​5970)
  • 3.x line: >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.4 -> fixed in 3.1.4 (#​5969, 5bf23ed)
Severity / CWE

Maintainer: minor. Reporter: HIGH. CWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization); related CWE-1220.

Credits

Omkhar Arasaratnam (@​omkhar) - finder.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

jackson-databind has a PolymorphicTypeValidator bypass via generic type parameters that allows arbitrary class instantiation

CVE-2026-54512 / GHSA-j3rv-43j4-c7qm

More information

Details

jackson-databind's PolymorphicTypeValidator (PTV) is the primary safety mechanism guarding polymorphic deserialization. When polymorphic typing is enabled and a type identifier contains generic parameters (i.e. the type ID string contains <), DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() validates only the raw container class name (the substring before <) against the configured PTV.

If the container type is approved, the method parses the full canonical type string via TypeFactory.constructFromCanonical() and returns the fully parameterized type without ever validating the nested type arguments against the PTV. The nested type arguments are then resolved, instantiated, and populated as beans during deserialization.

An attacker who controls the type ID can therefore place a denied class as a generic type parameter of an allowed container — for example java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.Gadget> when only java.util.ArrayList is allow-listed. The container passes the PTV check; com.evil.Gadget is loaded via Class.forName(name, true, loader), instantiated, and its properties are set from attacker-controlled JSON. This completely bypasses an explicitly configured PTV allow-list.

This is the same vulnerability class responsible for the historical sequence of jackson-databind deserialization CVEs; here it manifests as a validator bypass rather than a missing deny-list entry.

Impact
  • Bypass of the PTV allow-list, including the recommended BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator configured with name-prefix allow rules.
  • Arbitrary class instantiation of any type assignable to the container's element/parameter position, with attacker-controlled property values (setter/field injection).
  • Potential unauthenticated remote code execution when a class with exploitable side effects (JNDI lookup, JDBC/connection-pool gadgets,TemplatesImpl-style loaders, etc.) is present on the classpath.

Applications that accept untrusted JSON and rely on a configured PTV — the documented, security-conscious configuration — are affected.

Proof of Concept

Configuration restricting polymorphic deserialization to a single safe container:

BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator ptv = BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.builder()
        .allowIfSubType("java.util.ArrayList")
        .build();

ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder()
        .polymorphicTypeValidator(ptv)
        .build();

Malicious payload (Wrapper.value is Object with @JsonTypeInfo(use = Id.CLASS, include = As.WRAPPER_ARRAY)):

{"value":["java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.EvilGadget>",[{"cmd":"calc.exe"}]]}

On vulnerable versions, com.evil.EvilGadget is instantiated and its cmd property is set, despite only java.util.ArrayList being allow-listed. On 2.18.8 / 2.21.4 / 3.1.4 the deserialization throws InvalidTypeIdException before instantiation.

Variant payloads (all bypass an ArrayList/HashMap allow-list):

Type ID Smuggled type position
java.util.ArrayList<Evil> list element
java.util.HashMap<Evil,String> map key
java.util.HashMap<String,Evil> map value
java.util.ArrayList<java.util.ArrayList<Evil>> nested element
java.util.ArrayList<Evil[]> array element
Patches

Fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4 and 3.1.4 via the changes for FasterXML/jackson-databind#5988, commit 434d6c511. The fix adds recursive validation of each non-trivial type parameter (and array element types appearing as parameters) through the full PTV chain, with documented exemptions for Object (wildcard resolution) and Enum types.

PolymorphicTypeValidator was added in 2.10.0 so vulnerability N/A for versions prior to that.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

jackson-databind has an array subtype allowlist bypass in BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator (allowIfSubTypeIsArray)

CVE-2026-54513 / GHSA-rmj7-2vxq-3g9f

More information

Details

Summary

BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.Builder.allowIfSubTypeIsArray() allowlists any array type based only on clazz.isArray(), without validating the array's component (element) type against the configured allowlist. A PTV built with allowIfSubTypeIsArray() plus an explicit concrete-type allowlist therefore still permits EvilType[] even though EvilType is not allowlisted. When Jackson deserializes the elements and no per-element type IDs are present, it instantiates the component type directly with no further PTV check, bypassing the allowlist.

Impact

Applications using BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator with allowIfSubTypeIsArray() as a safeguard get no protection for concrete array component types; an attacker controlling JSON can instantiate non-allowlisted types via an array wrapper, re-opening the gadget-instantiation risk PTV is meant to prevent.

Affected / Patched (verified via git tag --contains)
  • 2.18 line: >= 2.10.0, < 2.18.8 -> fixed in 2.18.8
  • 2.19-2.21 line: >= 2.19.0, < 2.21.4 -> fixed in 2.21.4
  • 3.x line: >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.4 -> fixed in 3.1.4

PolymorphicTypeValidator was added in 2.10.0 so vulnerability N/A for versions prior to that.

Severity / CWE

Maintainer: significant. Reporter: HIGH. CWE-184 (Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs); related CWE-502.

Upstream fix

FasterXML/jackson-databind#5981; fix PR #​5983 (24529da), 2.18 backport PR #​5984 (01d1692). Released 2026-06-04 in 2.18.8 / 2.21.4 / 3.1.4.

Credits

Omkhar Arasaratnam (@​omkhar) - finder.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

jackson-databind: InetSocketAddress deserialization triggers eager DNS resolution (SSRF)

CVE-2026-54514 / GHSA-hgj6-7826-r7m5

More information

Details

Summary

JDKFromStringDeserializer constructed InetSocketAddress with new InetSocketAddress(host, port), which performs eager DNS name resolution for hostname inputs at deserialization time. An application that binds untrusted JSON into a type containing an InetSocketAddress field issues an attacker-chosen DNS query during readValue, before any application-level validation or connect logic. The fix uses InetSocketAddress.createUnresolved(host, port), deferring DNS to an explicit connect.

Impact

An attacker controlling JSON deserialized into an InetSocketAddress-bearing type can force outbound DNS lookups for attacker-chosen hostnames at deserialization time (SSRF / DNS-based out-of-band interaction / internal-resolver probing), purely from binding.

Affected / Patched (verified via git tag --contains on 1f5a103)
  • 2.18 line: >= 2.18.0, < 2.18.8 -> fixed in 2.18.8
  • 2.19-2.21 line: >= 2.19.0, < 2.21.4 -> fixed in 2.21.4
  • 3.x line: >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.4 -> fixed in 3.1.4
Severity / CWE

Maintainer: minor. Reporter: LOW. CWE-918 (SSRF).

Upstream fix

FasterXML/jackson-databind#5951 ("Improve InetSocketAddress deserialization"). Released 2026-06-04 in 2.18.8 / 2.21.4 / 3.1.4.

Credits

Omkhar Arasaratnam (@​omkhar) - finder.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

jackson-databind has case-insensitive deserialization bypasses per-property @​JsonIgnoreProperties

CVE-2026-54515 / GHSA-5jmj-h7xm-6q6v

More information

Details

Summary

In BeanDeserializerBase.createContextual(), per-property @JsonIgnoreProperties exclusions are applied by _handleByNameInclusion(), producing a contextual deserializer whose BeanPropertyMap has the ignored properties removed. The subsequent per-property case-insensitivity block (triggered by @JsonFormat(ACCEPT_CASE_INSENSITIVE_PROPERTIES)) rebuilds from this._beanProperties (the original, unfiltered map) instead of contextual._beanProperties, then overwrites the filtered map — restoring every property _handleByNameInclusion had just removed. The ignored property becomes writable again.

Impact

An application that both enables case-insensitive matching and relies on per-property @JsonIgnoreProperties to keep a field unwritable can have that field set from untrusted JSON (mass-assignment-style write).

Affected / Patched

Will be fixed in 2.18.9, 2.21.5, 2.22.1 and 3.1.4.

Severity / CWE

Maintainer: minor. Reporter: Moderate. CWE-915.

Upstream fix

FasterXML/jackson-databind#5962 (PR #​5964, 0e1b0b2), milestone 3.1.4. Released 2026-06-04.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

jackson-databind: @​JsonIgnore on a Record property is bypassed with a PropertyNamingStrategy

CVE-2026-59888 / GHSA-3pjw-73gf-8qr5

More information

Details

Summary

For Java Records, POJOPropertiesCollector._removeUnwantedIgnorals() records a @JsonIgnore-annotated component under its original implicit name before _renameUsing() applies the PropertyNamingStrategy. After the rename, _ignoredPropertyNames still holds only the pre-rename name, so _ignorableProps is built from the stale key. The renamed JSON key passes IgnorePropertiesUtil.shouldIgnore() and is assigned to the Record's constructor parameter, defeating the @JsonIgnore.

Impact

A Record using a naming strategy that relies on @JsonIgnore to keep an internal/privileged component out of deserialization can have that component set from the wire via its renamed key (e.g. a role/flag controlled by an untrusted client).

Affected / Patched (verified via git tag --contains)
  • 2.15-2.18 line: >= 2.15.0, < 2.18.8 -> fixed in 2.18.8 (backport c7c6783)
  • 2.19-2.21 line: >= 2.19.0, < 2.21.4 -> fixed in 2.21.4
  • 3.x line: >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.4 -> fixed in 3.1.4 (#​5974, baa2cdf)
Severity / CWE

Maintainer: minor. Reporter: Moderate. CWE-915; related CWE-345.

Credits

Omkhar Arasaratnam (@​omkhar) - finder.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

jackson-databind has @​JsonView bypass for setterless creator properties

CVE-2026-54517 / GHSA-5hh8-q8hv-fr38

More information

Details

Summary

In BeanDeserializer._deserializeUsingPropertyBased, the active-view (@JsonView) filter was applied only to creator properties; the regular property-buffering branch performed no prop.visibleInView(activeView) check. A change making SetterlessProperty.isMerging() return true routed setterless Collection/Map properties through this unguarded path, so a setterless collection annotated with a restricted @JsonView is populated from attacker JSON even when the active view excludes it.

Impact

View-restricted (e.g. admin-only) setterless collection/map properties can be written from untrusted JSON despite @JsonView gating — an access-control / mass-assignment bypass. No RCE or DoS.

Affected / Patched (verified via git tag --contains)
  • 2.21 line: >= 2.21.0, < 2.21.4 -> fixed in 2.21.4 (backport 94c5d21, #​5970)
  • 3.x line: >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.4 -> fixed in 3.1.4 (#​5969, 5bf23ed)
Severity / CWE

Maintainer: minor. Reporter: HIGH. CWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization); related CWE-1220.

Credits

Omkhar Arasaratnam (@​omkhar) - finder.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

jackson-databind's renamed @​JsonIgnore'd setters can deserialize via private fields

CVE-2026-54516 / GHSA-9fxm-vc8v-hj55

More information

Details

Summary

POJOPropertiesCollector._renameProperties() allows a property with @JsonProperty("renamed") on the getter and @JsonIgnore on the setter to be renamed rather than dropped. With MapperFeature.INFER_PROPERTY_MUTATORS enabled (default), the private backing field is retained; during deserialization BeanDeserializerFactory.addBeanProps() sees hasField()==true, builds a FieldProperty, and makes the backing field writable. An attacker supplying the renamed JSON key writes the backing field directly, bypassing the @JsonIgnore on the setter.

Impact

POJOs combining a renamed getter with an ignored setter (a read-only-over-the-wire pattern) have that field silently set from attacker input (property tampering / mass assignment). Not a general gadget; no RCE.

Affected / Patched (verified via git tag --contains)
  • 2.21 line: >= 2.21.0, < 2.21.4 -> fixed in 2.21.4 (backport c3d56dd, #​5968)
  • 3.x line: >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.4 -> fixed in 3.1.4 (#​5967, e88cb17)
Severity / CWE

Maintainer: minor. Reporter: HIGH. CWE-915.

Credits

Omkhar Arasaratnam (@​omkhar) - finder.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

jackson-databind: InetSocketAddress deserialization triggers eager DNS resolution (SSRF)

CVE-2026-54514 / GHSA-hgj6-7826-r7m5

More information

Details

Summary

JDKFromStringDeserializer constructed InetSocketAddress with new InetSocketAddress(host, port), which performs eager DNS name resolution for hostname inputs at deserialization time. An application that binds untrusted JSON into a type containing an InetSocketAddress field issues an attacker-chosen DNS query during readValue, before any application-level validation or connect logic. The fix uses InetSocketAddress.createUnresolved(host, port), deferring DNS to an explicit connect.

Impact

An attacker controlling JSON deserialized into an InetSocketAddress-bearing type can force outbound DNS lookups for attacker-chosen hostnames at deserialization time (SSRF / DNS-based out-of-band interaction / internal-resolver probing), purely from binding.

Affected / Patched (verified via git tag --contains on 1f5a103)
  • 2.18 line: >= 2.18.0, < 2.18.8 -> fixed in 2.18.8
  • 2.19-2.21 line: >= 2.19.0, < 2.21.4 -> fixed in 2.21.4
  • 3.x line: >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.4 -> fixed in 3.1.4
Severity / CWE

Maintainer: minor. Reporter: LOW. CWE-918 (SSRF).

Upstream fix

FasterXML/jackson-databind#5951 ("Improve InetSocketAddress deserialization"). Released 2026-06-04 in 2.18.8 / 2.21.4 / 3.1.4.

Credits

Omkhar Arasaratnam (@​omkhar) - finder.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

jackson-databind has a PolymorphicTypeValidator bypass via generic type parameters that allows arbitrary class instantiation

CVE-2026-54512 / GHSA-j3rv-43j4-c7qm

More information

Details

jackson-databind's PolymorphicTypeValidator (PTV) is the primary safety mechanism guarding polymorphic deserialization. When polymorphic typing is enabled and a type identifier contains generic parameters (i.e. the type ID string contains <), DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() validates only the raw container class name (the substring before <) against the configured PTV.

If the container type is approved, the method parses the full canonical type string via TypeFactory.constructFromCanonical() and returns the fully parameterized type without ever validating the nested type arguments against the PTV. The nested type arguments are then resolved, instantiated, and populated as beans during deserialization.

An attacker who controls the type ID can therefore place a denied class as a generic type parameter of an allowed container — for example java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.Gadget> when only java.util.ArrayList is allow-listed. The container passes the PTV check; com.evil.Gadget is loaded via Class.forName(name, true, loader), instantiated, and its properties are set from attacker-controlled JSON. This completely bypasses an explicitly configured PTV allow-list.

This is the same vulnerability class responsible for the historical sequence of jackson-databind deserialization CVEs; here it manifests as a validator bypass rather than a missing deny-list entry.

Impact
  • Bypass of the PTV allow-list, including the recommended BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator configured with name-prefix allow rules.
  • Arbitrary class instantiation of any type assignable to the container's element/parameter position, with attacker-controlled property values (setter/field injection).
  • Potential unauthenticated remote code execution when a class with exploitable side effects (JNDI lookup, JDBC/connection-pool gadgets,TemplatesImpl-style loaders, etc.) is present on the classpath.

Applications that accept untrusted JSON and rely on a configured PTV — the documented, security-conscious configuration — are affected.

Proof of Concept

Configuration restricting polymorphic deserialization to a single safe container:

BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator ptv = BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.builder()
        .allowIfSubType("java.util.ArrayList")
        .build();

ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder()
        .polymorphicTypeValidator(ptv)
        .build();

Malicious payload (Wrapper.value is Object with @JsonTypeInfo(use = Id.CLASS, include = As.WRAPPER_ARRAY)):

{"value":["java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.EvilGadget>",[{"cmd":"calc.exe"}]]}

On vulnerable versions, com.evil.EvilGadget is instantiated and its cmd property is set, despite only java.util.ArrayList being allow-listed. On 2.18.8 / 2.21.4 / 3.1.4 the deserialization throws InvalidTypeIdException before instantiation.

Variant payloads (all bypass an ArrayList/HashMap allow-list):

Type ID Smuggled type position
java.util.ArrayList<Evil> list element
java.util.HashMap<Evil,String> map key
java.util.HashMap<String,Evil> map value
java.util.ArrayList<java.util.ArrayList<Evil>> nested element
java.util.ArrayList<Evil[]> array element
Patches

Fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4 and 3.1.4 via the changes for FasterXML/jackson-databind#5988, commit 434d6c511. The fix adds recursive validation of each non-trivial type parameter (and array element types appearing as parameters) through the full PTV chain, with documented exemptions for Object (wildcard resolution) and Enum types.

PolymorphicTypeValidator was added in 2.10.0 so vulnerability N/A for versions prior to that.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

jackson-databind has a @​JsonView bypass for unwrapped creator parameters

CVE-2026-54518 / GHSA-rcqc-6cw3-h962

More information

Details

Summary

UnwrappedPropertyHandler.processUnwrappedCreatorProperties() replays buffered JSON into creator parameters but never consults prop.visibleInView(activeView). The normal property-based creator path gates creator properties on the active view, but this unwrapped-creator replay path bypasses that check, so a constructor parameter annotated with both @JsonView(AdminView.class) and @JsonUnwrapped is populated from attacker JSON even when a more restrictive view is active.

Impact

View-restricted unwrapped creator parameters can be set from untrusted input where @JsonView is used as a write-side authorization boundary.

Affected / Patched (verified via git tag --contains)
  • 2.21 line: >= 2.21.0, < 2.21.4 -> fixed in 2.21.4 (backport 721fa07, #​5973)
  • 3.x line: >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.4 -> fixed in 3.1.4 (#​5971, d633bc0)
Severity / CWE

Maintainer: minor. Reporter: HIGH. CWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization); related CWE-284.

Credits

Omkhar Arasaratnam (@​omkhar) - finder.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

jackson-databind has an array subtype allowlist bypass in BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator (allowIfSubTypeIsArray)

CVE-2026-54513 / GHSA-rmj7-2vxq-3g9f

More information

Details

Summary

BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.Builder.allowIfSubTypeIsArray() allowlists any array type based only on clazz.isArray(), without validating the array's component (element) type against the configured allowlist. A PTV built with allowIfSubTypeIsArray() plus an explicit concrete-type allowlist therefore still permits EvilType[] even though EvilType is not allowlisted. When Jackson deserializes the elements and no per-element type IDs are present, it instantiates the component type directly with no further PTV check, bypassing the allowlist.

Impact

Applications using BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator with allowIfSubTypeIsArray() as a safeguard get no protection for concrete array component types; an attacker controlling JSON can instantiate non-allowlisted types via an array wrapper, re-opening the gadget-instantiation risk PTV is meant to prevent.

Affected / Patched (verified via git tag --contains)
  • 2.18 line: >= 2.10.0, < 2.18.8 -> fixed in 2.18.8
  • 2.19-2.21 line: >= 2.19.0, < 2.21.4 -> fixed in 2.21.4
  • 3.x line: >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.4 -> fixed in 3.1.4

PolymorphicTypeValidator was added in 2.10.0 so vulnerability N/A for versions prior to that.

Severity / CWE

Maintainer: significant. Reporter: HIGH. CWE-184 (Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs); related CWE-502.

Upstream fix

FasterXML/jackson-databind#5981; fix PR #​5983 (24529da), 2.18 backport PR #​5984 (01d1692). Released 2026-06-04 in 2.18.8 / 2.21.4 / 3.1.4.

Credits

Omkhar Arasaratnam (@​omkhar) - finder.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

jackson-databind: @​JsonView ypassed for @​JsonUnwrapped container properties on deserialization

CVE-2026-59889 / GHSA-5gvw-p9qm-jgwh

More information

Details

Summary

UnwrappedPropertyHandler.processUnwrapped() replays the buffered JSON for a @JsonUnwrapped property by iterating its properties and calling prop.deserializeAndSet() with no prop.visibleInView(ctxt.getActiveView()) guard — the exact guard processUnwrappedCreatorProperties() received in the #​5971 / GHSA-rcqc-6cw3-h962 fix, and the guard BeanDeserializer.deserializeWithUnwrapped applies to directly-matched properties. As a result, a property annotated with both @JsonView(PrivilegedView.class) and @JsonUnwrapped is written from attacker JSON even when deserializing under a more-restrictive active view.

Correction to the original framing (runtime-verified): the gap is NOT a per-field inner @JsonView (the unwrapped sub-object's own BeanDeserializer gates inner fields correctly). The unchecked gate is the view of the unwrapped CONTAINER property.

Intent proof (runtime, 2.x HEAD 21dd70dd and 3.x HEAD 7a5939d6)

An @JsonView(AdminView) property that is NOT @JsonUnwrapped → null under PublicView (correctly gated). The identical property WITH @JsonUnwrapped → fully populated (bypass). The fix the creator path already received, not applied to the regular-property method.

Impact — write-side mass-assignment / privilege escalation

@JsonView is commonly used as a write-side authorization guard: a public endpoint binds the body under readerWithView(PublicView.class) and groups privileged state in a nested object whose container property is @JsonView(AdminView). When that property is @JsonUnwrapped, an untrusted caller mass-assigns it. PoC: a self-service registration where AccountFlags{role,approved,creditBalance} is @JsonView(AdminView) @&#8203;JsonUnwrapped; attacker JSON {role:ADMIN,approved:true,creditBalance:1000000} under PublicView binds all three → approved admin with arbitrary balance. The failing gate is a WRITE gate, hence integrity-high (C:N/I:H/A:N); no worse than the C:L/I:L parent and arguably higher as @JsonView-as-write-guard is the exact use case #​5971/#​5969 defended.

Affected
  • com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind 2.x: confirmed bypass at 21dd70dd (== released 2.21.4 / 2.22.0 line; includes the #​5973 backport). DEFAULT_VIEW_INCLUSION default=true.
  • tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind 3.x: confirmed bypass at HEAD 7a5939d6 (latest 3.x). DEFAULT_VIEW_INCLUSION default=false → the stock-config repro is the common shape where privileged inner fields are individually @JsonView(PublicView) and the developer relies on the container @JsonView(AdminView); the 3.x PoC mass-assigns role/approved/creditBalance under PublicView. (The other simultaneous report's PoC was reportedly fixed on 3.x; this distinct container-property path is not.)
Additive variants (runtime-confirmed both branches; all closed by the same one-line guard)
  • nested @JsonUnwrapped (unwrapped-in-unwrapped) — recursive bypass.
  • merge / readerWithView(...).withValueToUpdate(...) (PATCH/partial-update) — bypass; non-unwrapped merge control gates correctly.
  • builder-based deserializer (@JsonDeserialize(builder=...)) — BuilderBasedDeserializer routes through the same processUnwrapped.
  • Honest non-findings: read-side serialization correctly honors views (no leak); @JsonAnySetter+view and @JsonTypeInfo+@JsonUnwrapped are separate/unsupported behaviors, not this bug.
Fix

Add prop.visibleInView(ctxt.getActiveView()) (when MapperFeature.DEFAULT_VIEW_INCLUSION/active-view applies) to the processUnwrapped() property loop, mirroring processUnwrappedCreatorProperties(). One change closes the impact PoC + all three variants across BeanDeserializer and BuilderBasedDeserializer. Full runnable PoCs (2.x + 3.x) + variant harnesses available on request.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

jackson-databind has case-insensitive deserialization bypasses per-property @​JsonIgnoreProperties

CVE-2026-54515 / GHSA-5jmj-h7xm-6q6v

More information

Details

Summary

In BeanDeserializerBase.createContextual(), per-property @JsonIgnoreProperties exclusions are applied by _handleByNameInclusion(), producing a contextual deserializer whose BeanPropertyMap has the ignored properties removed. The subsequent per-property case-insensitivity block (triggered by @JsonFormat(ACCEPT_CASE_INSENSITIVE_PROPERTIES)) rebuilds from this._beanProperties (the original, unfiltered map) instead of contextual._beanProperties, then overwrites the filtered map — restoring every property _handleByNameInclusion had just removed. The ignored property becomes writable again.

Impact

An application that both enables case-insensitive matching and relies on per-property @JsonIgnoreProperties to keep a field unwritable can have that field set from untrusted JSON (mass-assignment-style write).

Affected / Patched

Will be fixed in 2.18.9, 2.21.5, 2.22.1 and 3.1.4.

Severity / CWE

Maintainer: minor. Reporter: Moderate. CWE-915.

Upstream fix

FasterXML/jackson-databind#5962 (PR #​5964, 0e1b0b2), milestone 3.1.4. Released 2026-06-04.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

References

✂ Note

PR body was truncated to here.

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⛔ Snyk checks have failed. 15 issues have been found so far.

Status Scan Engine Critical High Medium Low Total (15)
⛔ Open Source Security 2 13 0 0 15 issues
✅ Licenses 0 0 0 0 0 issues
✅ Code Security 0 0 0 0 0 issues

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@renovate renovate Bot changed the title security(maven): 🛡️ minor 🛡️ vulnerability [high] security(maven): 🛡️ minor compile to v2.22.0 Jun 25, 2026
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renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/vulnerability-high branch from ccf5c90 to dff9df5 Compare July 1, 2026 22:15
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title security(maven): 🛡️ minor compile to v2.22.0 security(maven): 🛡️ patch compile to v2.21.4 Jul 1, 2026
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renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/vulnerability-high branch from dff9df5 to c6b4a6a Compare July 17, 2026 10:45
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title security(maven): 🛡️ patch compile to v2.21.4 security(maven): 🛡️ patch compile to v2.21.5 Jul 17, 2026
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renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/vulnerability-high branch from c6b4a6a to 22b074d Compare July 22, 2026 02:02
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title security(maven): 🛡️ patch compile to v2.21.5 security(maven): 🛡️ patch 🛡️ vulnerability [high] Jul 22, 2026
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