Promote dev → main

.github/workflows/promote-to-main.yml

@@ -41,6 +41,11 @@ jobs:
           # Fine-grained PAT (Contents + Pull requests: read/write) — the built-in
           # GITHUB_TOKEN is blocked from creating PRs by org policy, so we use a PAT.
           GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.PROMOTE_TOKEN }}
+          # Pass run inputs through the environment rather than interpolating
+          # ${{ … }} straight into the script, which would let crafted text run
+          # as shell (GitHub Actions script-injection antipattern).
+          PR_TITLE: ${{ inputs.pr_title }}
+          DISPATCHER: ${{ github.actor }}
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
           if [ -z "${GH_TOKEN:-}" ]; then
@@ -58,8 +63,8 @@ jobs:
           pr="$(gh pr list --base main --head dev --state open --json number --jq '.[0].number')"
           if [ -z "$pr" ]; then
             url="$(gh pr create --base main --head dev \
-              --title "${{ inputs.pr_title }}" \
-              --body "Automated promotion of \`dev\` → \`main\`, dispatched by @${{ github.actor }}.")"
+              --title "$PR_TITLE" \
+              --body "Automated promotion of \`dev\` → \`main\`, dispatched by @${DISPATCHER}.")"
             pr="${url##*/}"
           fi
 

README.md

@@ -86,6 +86,12 @@ Until `RESEND_API_KEY` and `CONTACT_FROM` are set, the endpoint returns
 `503 { code: "not_configured" }` and the form tells the visitor to email us
 directly — it never silently drops a message.
 
+The endpoint sanitises input, drops bots via a honeypot, and applies a
+best-effort per-instance rate limit (5 requests/minute/IP → `429`). Because
+Vercel functions are ephemeral and horizontally scaled, that limit is not a
+hard global cap; if abuse becomes a concern, back it with a durable store
+(Vercel KV / Upstash Redis) for a true cross-instance limit.
+
 ## License
 
 Apache-2.0.

api/contact.js

@@ -20,8 +20,30 @@ const ROUTES = {
 
 const EMAIL_RE = /^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/;
 
+// Best-effort, per-instance rate limit. Vercel functions are ephemeral and
+// horizontally scaled, so this is not a hard global cap — it just blunts a
+// trivial single-source flood that would burn the Resend quota or spam the
+// inbox. A durable limiter (Vercel KV / Upstash) would be the real fix; see
+// the security note in the README.
+const RATE_LIMIT = { max: 5, windowMs: 60_000 };
+const hits = new Map(); // ip -> number[] (timestamps within the window)
+
+function rateLimited(ip) {
+  const now = Date.now();
+  const recent = (hits.get(ip) || []).filter((t) => now - t < RATE_LIMIT.windowMs);
+  recent.push(now);
+  hits.set(ip, recent);
+  if (hits.size > 5000) hits.clear(); // bound memory on a long-lived instance
+  return recent.length > RATE_LIMIT.max;
+}
+
 function clamp(s, n) {
-  return String(s == null ? "" : s).slice(0, n).trim();
+  // Strip control chars (incl. CR/LF) so user input can't smuggle structure
+  // into the email subject/headers, then bound length.
+  return String(s == null ? "" : s)
+    .replace(/[\x00-\x1F\x7F]/g, " ")
+    .slice(0, n)
+    .trim();
 }
 function escapeHtml(s) {
   return String(s).replace(/[&<>"']/g, (c) =>
@@ -35,6 +57,13 @@ export default async function handler(req, res) {
     return res.status(405).json({ error: "Method not allowed" });
   }
 
+  // Per-instance throttle to blunt floods (see rateLimited above).
+  const ip = (req.headers["x-forwarded-for"] || "").split(",")[0].trim() || "unknown";
+  if (rateLimited(ip)) {
+    res.setHeader("Retry-After", "60");
+    return res.status(429).json({ error: "Too many requests. Please try again in a minute." });
+  }
+
   // Body may arrive parsed (object) or raw (string) depending on runtime.
   let body = req.body;
   if (typeof body === "string") {

vercel.json

@@ -11,7 +11,13 @@
       "headers": [
         { "key": "X-Content-Type-Options", "value": "nosniff" },
         { "key": "X-Frame-Options", "value": "SAMEORIGIN" },
-        { "key": "Referrer-Policy", "value": "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" }
+        { "key": "Referrer-Policy", "value": "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" },
+        { "key": "Strict-Transport-Security", "value": "max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains" },
+        { "key": "Permissions-Policy", "value": "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), browsing-topics=()" },
+        {
+          "key": "Content-Security-Policy",
+          "value": "default-src 'self'; base-uri 'self'; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'; form-action 'self'; script-src 'self' https://va.vercel-scripts.com; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https://huggingface.co https://*.huggingface.co https://*.hf.co; media-src 'self' https://huggingface.co https://*.huggingface.co https://*.hf.co; connect-src 'self' https://va.vercel-scripts.com https://*.vercel-insights.com https://huggingface.co https://*.huggingface.co https://*.hf.co; upgrade-insecure-requests"
+        }
       ]
     }
   ]