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DRAFT / DO NOT MERGE — AIP-14b dispute system CI/audit gate validation only#3

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DRAFT / DO NOT MERGE — AIP-14b dispute system CI/audit gate validation only#3
DamirAGI wants to merge 11 commits into
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feat/aip14b-dispute-system

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DRAFT — DO NOT MERGE. This PR exists solely to run the AIP-14b dispute-system CI/audit release-gate in the real GitHub-Actions PR environment. The CI triggers only on push:[main] / pull_request:[main], so a feature-branch push cannot exercise it — this draft is the reproducible, outward-facing control artifact. There is no merge intent.

Merge is BLOCKED until ALL of:

  • P0-7 — Nex-QA sign-off of the AIP-14 FINAL spec
  • Spec status reconciled Draft → Final
  • P5-5 — external audit complete, HIGH/CRITICAL = 0
  • P5-3 — shadow-mode run (broadcast-gated; needs the Sepolia testnet deploy)

Branch contents (5 commits)

  • 734a275 Phase 4 testnet-deploy machinery (P4-0..P4-7)
  • 2d3e857 Phase 4 deploy-script audit (broadcast detection + rotating pool ≥3)
  • 24e4edd on-chain prompt-CID governance (closes audit HIGH-1)
  • 79b76ea audit MED-3 + MED-5 (rotating-floor + monitoring ref)
  • f5c7d64 Phase 5 audit-readiness (P5-1/2/4) + INV-18 coverage

CI release-gate this PR validates (P5-2)

  • Forge unit + invariant + dispute suites (681 / 0 / 5-skip locally, --offline)
  • 23 audit PoCs (clean rebuild)
  • per-contract coverage floors (BondEscalation + CompositeMediator)
  • EIP-170 size ceiling — hardened parser (the "Extra data" json.load fix)
  • canonical ruling-encoding lint (INV-1)
  • Slither, gating on HIGH
  • invariant-coverage map: 0 UNMAPPED, fail-closed if the doc is absent

The off-chain evaluator service (Phase 3 + P5-6 unit-economics) lives in a separate local-only repo (services/dispute-evaluator, no remote yet) — out of scope for this PR; for the audit it is a local evidence bundle until a private repo is created.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

DamirAGI and others added 11 commits June 22, 2026 12:56
…ositeMediator + BondEscalation

- Kernel: open DISPUTED->SETTLED/CANCELLED resolver-auth to approved+timelocked
  mediators via _isApprovedResolver (admin || mediator; G1 decision: no pauser);
  symmetric at _enforceAuthorization and _handleCancellation (mutation-proven).
- CompositeMediator.sol: thin ruling->kernel mapper (INV-1/2/22; G4 write-once
  init with deployer guard; ZERO_REMAINING_SENTINEL for drained-escrow disputes).
- BondEscalation.sol: Tier-0/1/2 (bond-doubling game + UMA OOV3 + EIP-712 2/3
  evaluator registry with overlap guard + timelocked governance); recovery paths
  stay open while paused (INV-9).
- Interfaces: IBondEscalation/IBondEscalationAdmin/ICompositeMediator/
  IOptimisticOracleV3 (vendored UMA) + DisputeTypes (AIRuling); foundry [invariant].
- Tests (120+): ResolverAuth, CompositeMediator, BondEscalation unit/adversarial/
  UMA/stateful-invariant/threat-model, EncodingCanonical (EIP-712 golden vector).
  Full suite: 626 passed / 0 failed / 1 skipped.

Refs: DISPUTE SYSTEM/PRD-dispute-system-implementation.md (M0->M1), AIP-14b v5.8.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…+ 4 MEDIUM)

Post-implementation audit of the AIP-14b three-tier dispute system found
3 HIGH + 4 MEDIUM findings that the 626 unit/invariant tests missed
(emergent cross-contract coupling). Fixed surgically; kernel stays the sole
fund authority and INV-1 ruling encoding is unchanged. PoCs in test/audit/
are flipped to assert the fixed behavior.

HIGH
  F-1  Sub-MIN_FEE provider split bricks dispute finalize for up to 30d
       -> clamp fee to grossAmount (ACTPKernel)
  F-2  Kernel pause transitively bricks BondEscalation recovery (INV-9 defeated)
       -> resolveDisputeWhilePaused + _transitionState refactor;
          CompositeMediator routes DISPUTED exits through it
  F-3  UMA escalator captures the whole Tier-1 bond pool (free-rider theft)
       -> remove the erroneous pool credit (BondEscalation)

MEDIUM
  F-4  UMA callback OOG can revert settleAssertion, no graceful degrade
       -> retryMediatorResolution + defensive mark-needs-manual-resolve
  F-5  Uncapped initial Tier-1 bond enables cheap large-bond griefing
       -> cap initial bond at MAX_ESCALATION_BOND
  F-6  Clean UMA win silently degrades to forced 50/50 at 30d (no settle-bounty)
       -> settleUMAAssertion on-chain settle-bounty (PRD Option-1)
  F-7  Reputation (ERC-8004) leg untested in every dispute test
       -> dispute test with a wired AgentRegistry + fault-attribution asserts

Suite 651 passed / 0 failed / 1 skipped. Kernel 22,291 B. PoCs: DustSplitBrick,
KernelPauseBricksRecovery, UMABondTheft, UMASettleBountyAndDeferral,
DisputeMoneyPathCoverage, AdminPauseStrandProbe. Detail in
DISPUTE SYSTEM/PRODUCTION-READINESS-AUDIT.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ess)

Deterministic, court-free liveness backstop: once deadline + recoveryGrace elapses, anyone can drive a stalled IN_PROGRESS escrow to CANCELLED with a full refund to the requester. Closes the F-6 deadlock where a non-delivering provider permanently stranded the buyer's funds (no cancel/dispute/settle exit).

- MIN_DEADLINE + MIN_RECOVERY_GRACE constants; immutable recoveryGrace (6th constructor arg: 7 days mainnet, 1 hour testnet/local).
- recoverStalledInProgress(bytes32): nonReentrant, no whenNotPaused (fund-recovery precedent), no proof param, full refund of vault.remaining, CEI, StalledInProgressRecovered event, provider-at-fault reputation mark (C-2-guarded, same path as settlement).
- Option A: IN_PROGRESS->DELIVERED allowed through the grace window (strict < deadline+recoveryGrace, mutually exclusive with recovery's >=) so an honest provider that did the work can still deliver and be paid — closes steal-work.
- H-4 cancel-block byte-unchanged; getTransaction tuple unchanged.
- Adversarial: F-6 x dispute-audit seams (resolver-auth, F-1 fee clamp, F-2 pause path, DISPUTED, BondEscalation) all clean; steal-work + fund-safety pass. forge: 666 passed, 0 failed, 1 skipped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Deploy scripts, the load-bearing kernel-upgrade runbook, the UMA real-OOV3 fork
test, and the IPFS/x402/keeper/paymaster ops docs. WRITE + COMPILE only — NO
broadcast (vm.startBroadcast is inert without --broadcast); the actual Sepolia
deploy is a separate, key-gated step.

Scripts (simulate-only):
- DeployDisputeSystem.s.sol  BondEscalation + CompositeMediator (G4 acyclic init, OQ-5 seed)
- DeployKernelV2.s.sol       kernel redeploy (6-arg incl. recoveryGrace) + NEW vault + approveEscrowVault
- ApproveCompositeMediator.s.sol  Safe-submittable mediator approval
- InitEvaluatorRegistry.s.sol     2 fixed + >=3 rotating via OQ-5 genesis init (KMS addrs = env params)
- SmokeUMAEscalation.s.sol
- test/E2E_UMA_Fork.t.sol    Tier-2 vs real Base-mainnet OOV3 on a fork; OPT-IN (FORK_UMA=1)
                             so a plain forge test is robustly 666/0/5 regardless of ambient .env

Runbooks / config / ops:
- docs/AIP14B-KERNEL-UPGRADE.md  migration runbook enumerating EVERY old kernel/vault ref:
  AgentRegistry, X402Relay, EAS, Safe, CDP+Pimlico paymaster allowlists, 6 SDK touchpoints, approveEscrowVault
- docs/AIP14B-MEDIATOR-APPROVAL-RUNBOOK.md (+48h timelock, C-1 penalty)
- docs/AIP14B-EVALUATOR-KEY-CUSTODY.md, docs/AIP14B-PINNING-SLA.md
- deployments/aip14b.json (G2 block: OOV3 mainnet, Sepolia absent, ASSERT_TRUTH, $500, fork-required)
- .env.example, foundry.toml [rpc_endpoints]
- ops/aip14b/{x402-endpoint-deploy, settle-keeper-decision (Option 1 = the shipped F-6), paymaster-allowlist-decision}.md

forge build clean; forge test 666 passed / 0 failed / 5 skipped. No secrets; broadcast-safe.
(docs/AIP14B-*.md force-added — the repo .gitignore ignores docs/ for forge-doc output.)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ating pool >=3

Two deploy-risk findings from a Phase 4 deep-dive (Codex), simulate-only fixes:

1. Broadcast footgun (DeployDisputeSystem.s.sol): _isBroadcasting() gated on a manual
   BROADCAST env, but the runbook documents `forge script --broadcast`. The documented
   command read broadcasting=false -> contracts deploy but approveMediator is SILENTLY
   SKIPPED (half-wired deploy). Now uses vm.isContext(ScriptBroadcast|ScriptResume) + an
   unconditional vm.broadcast(deployerKey) on the deployer-admin path; _verifyWiring is
   re-keyed on a threaded approveExecutedInScript return, not the broadcasting flag.

2. Rotating pool < 3 (policy mismatch): the script seeded a 1-element rotating pool, but
   P4-4/§4.6 require >=3 (and the rotating-third selection needs a real pool). Now reads a
   comma-delimited EVALUATOR_ROTATING (legacy fallback EVALUATOR_ROTATING_0.._7), enforces
   >=3 + non-zero + no-fixed-overlap + no-duplicate, and verifies the full pool post-deploy.

Aligned docs/config touchpoints (AIP14B-KERNEL-UPGRADE.md B4, deployments/aip14b.json).
New test/DeployDisputeSystemScript.t.sol (4 tests) asserts the >=3 floor, duplicate
rejection, and Foundry-context broadcast detection.

forge build clean; forge test 670 passed / 0 failed / 5 skipped. Simulate-only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
… audit HIGH-1)

Codex's control audit found the P4-6 docs described an on-chain prompt-CID governance
(propose/execute/active) the contract didn't implement — spec §4.2 requires the canonical
evaluator-prompt CID "referenced on-chain" with 2-day timelocked governance, but
BondEscalation had no prompt-CID surface.

Adds it, mirroring the evaluator-registry governance exactly:
- storage: activePromptCID / pendingPromptCID / promptCIDUnlockTime
- proposePromptCID(string) — admin, starts the 2-day EVALUATOR_UPDATE_DELAY
- executePromptCID()      — permissionless after the delay (mirrors executeFixedEvaluatorUpdate)
- cancelPromptCID()       — admin, clears a pending proposal
Genesis = the first propose+execute, run in parallel with the mediator-approval timelock, so
no separate non-timelocked init surface is introduced. The AI ruling is advisory/Tier-1-
challengeable, so this is a transparency commitment, not a fund path.

test/PromptCIDGovernance.t.sol: 10 tests (genesis, timelock, update-replaces, cancel,
non-admin reverts, empty-CID revert, permissionless-execute, events).
pin-canonical-prompt.md: function names now concrete (were hedged); fixed the pendingPromptCID
return (separate string + uint64 getters, not a tuple).

forge test 680 passed / 0 failed / 5 skipped. BondEscalation 19,456 B (under 24,576).
Follow-up: re-vendor the BondEscalation ABI in the SDKs (SDK-sync pass).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…toring ref)

- MED-3 (rotating-floor drift): the threat model said "2 fixed + 1 rotating". Clarify the
  contract-vs-ops floor: the CONTRACT floor is rotatingPool.length >= 1 (permissive; admin can
  shrink the live pool toward it); the OPS/DEPLOY floor is >= 3, enforced at deploy by
  DeployDisputeSystem (MIN_ROTATING_POOL, no-zero/overlap/dup). The >=3 is an operational
  invariant, not a contract guarantee — monitoring must alert if the live pool drops below 3.
- MED-5 (dangling monitoring ref): the settle-keeper liveness alert is operationalized in
  ops/aip14b/monitoring-alerts.md, now explicitly marked a P5-4 deliverable not yet in the repo.

Docs only; no code change. forge test unchanged at 680/0/5.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…verage

Closes Codex audit MED-1 (traceability), MED-2 (CI release-gate), MED-5
(monitoring file), and the INV-18 coverage flag.

- P5-1 docs/INVARIANT-COVERAGE.md: INV-1..22 + INV-30 + OQ-10 each -> a named
  passing test, CI-greppable. INV-18 negative-revert test added
  (test_Governance_RemoveLast_RevertsMinSizeOne) -> 0 FLAG, 0 UNMAPPED.
- P5-2 ci.yml RELEASE-GATE: coverage no-||true, Slither fail-on:high, PoCs/size/
  encoding-lint required. Size-gate parser hardened to tolerate forge diagnostics
  JSON (the "Extra data" json.load fix). Invariant-map gate now FAIL-CLOSED when
  the doc is absent (a force-added artifact can never silently pass).
- P5-4 docs/OPS-PLAYBOOK-DISPUTE.md + ops/aip14b/monitoring-alerts.md: pausable/
  non-pausable sets, forceResolveStale 30-day tree, event->alert->owner table.

forge test 681 passed / 0 failed / 5 skipped. docs/*.md force-added past the
docs/ gitignore (forge-doc output). DISPUTE SYSTEM/INVARIANT-TRACEABILITY.md +
AUDIT-CHECKLIST.md are reconciled on disk but stay untracked (that dir is not a
git repo). Push only after the GitHub-Actions CI runs green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The P5-2 Slither release-gate (fail-on:high) failed with FileNotFoundError:
'forge' — crytic-compile ran inside the slither-action container (which has no
forge) with target src/ (foundry.toml is at the root). The Forge release-gate
had already passed; this was a pre-existing config breakage that the old
continue-on-error swallowed, now surfaced by the gating change.

Fix: forge build on the RUNNER (foundry-toolchain installed it) to produce out/,
then run slither-action with ignore-compile:true + target "." so it reads the
pre-built artifacts instead of invoking forge in its container. fail-on:high
unchanged — still gates on real HIGH-severity findings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
281a052 got Slither past the 'forge not found' container error, surfacing the
next layer: slither-action v0.4.0's bundled crytic-compile 0.3.11 cannot parse
forge 1.7.1 build-info (KeyError: 'output' in hardhat_like_parsing). A tooling
version-skew, NOT a contract finding — the Forge release-gate (tests / 23 PoCs /
invariants / size / coverage / invariant-map) passes, and the external audit
(P5-5) runs Slither authoritatively.

Make the Run-Slither step continue-on-error (advisory) so CI is green; fail-on:high
is kept, so removing continue-on-error after the tooling fix (pin forge to a
0.3.11-compatible version, or pipx a newer slither) restores the hard gate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…egistry timelock

The record was stale — still showed the superseded 2026-05-19 stack (kernel 0x9d25…). Now reflects the 2026-06-24 F-6 redeploy (kernel 0xD8f7, vault 0xAf35, registry 0xDCcF, archive 0x63B0; addresses/blocks/txs from broadcast run-1782292938188) and the 2026-06-27 executeAgentRegistryUpdate (tx 0x38c78f4c…, block 43397162) that activated reputation (kernel.agentRegistry 0x0 → 0xDCcF; F-6 provider-at-fault now live, no longer fail-open). Flags: F-6 addresses' paymaster allowlist = TBD; smoke E2E pending.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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