Please do not open public issues for suspected vulnerabilities.

Report privately through GitHub Security Advisories — "Report a vulnerability" on this repository's Security tab. If that is not possible, contact the maintainers listed in MAINTAINERS.md directly.

You will receive an acknowledgment within 3 business days. We aim to ship a fix, coordinated with the reporter, within 90 days of triage; credit is given unless you prefer otherwise.

Security fixes land on master and the most recent tagged release.

Useful context when assessing impact:

• The provider talks to sandboxd with a bearer token read from --sandboxd-token-file; that token grants claim/release authority over the node's warm pools and must be protected like any node credential.
• The claim state file (--state-path, written 0600) persists sandbox ids and their release tokens across restarts. Disclosure of that file grants the authority to tear down exactly the sandboxes this node delivered — nothing more — but it is still a secret.
• Destroying a VM requires the owner Sandbox CR to be confirmed gone or in teardown; pod-level state alone is never authority. Bypasses of that contract are security-relevant even when no data is exposed.
• The kubelet exec/logs/port-forward surfaces are intentionally not served; a change that opens them should be treated as an attack-surface change and reviewed as such.