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feat: implement OS-level command sandboxing with bwrap#87

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hellodk merged 4 commits into
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feat/command-sandboxing
Jul 16, 2026
Merged

feat: implement OS-level command sandboxing with bwrap#87
hellodk merged 4 commits into
masterfrom
feat/command-sandboxing

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@hellodk hellodk commented Jul 16, 2026

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Summary

Implements OS-level isolation for terminal command execution using Bubblewrap (bwrap), with graceful fallback to unsandboxed execution when bwrap is unavailable. This PR provides filesystem isolation (read-only system paths, writable work directory) and environment variable filtering (secrets stripped from the child process environment). It does not implement seccomp syscall filtering or network isolation enforcement beyond the --unshare-net flag already present in bwrap — those remain detection-only / best-effort in this PR.

  • Adds OSLevelSandbox class
  • Detects bwrap availability on Linux systems; detects (but does not enforce) seccomp kernel support
  • Executes commands via bwrap with read-only binds for /lib, /lib64, /usr, /bin, plus configurable extra readonly paths, and a bound writable work directory
  • Environment variable filtering: strips known secret/credential env vars (AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, DATABASE_PASSWORD, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY, and others) plus a pattern-based denylist (SECRET, TOKEN, API_KEY, ACCESS_KEY, PRIVATE_KEY, PASSWORD, CREDENTIAL) from the environment passed to both the bwrap-sandboxed process and the unsandboxed fallback process. Applied in src/safety/os-level-sandbox.ts (filterSensitiveEnv).
  • Graceful fallback to unsandboxed execution when bwrap unavailable
  • Integration-ready with existing CommandSandbox for defense-in-depth

Implementation Details

Core Components

  • OSLevelSandbox class: Manages OS-level command isolation
  • Bwrap integration: Filesystem isolation via read-only/writable binds; network isolation via --unshare-net when restrict_net is set
  • Seccomp support: detected (isSeccompSupported) but not enforced — no seccomp filter is generated or applied to the bwrap invocation in this PR
  • Environment filtering: filterSensitiveEnv() denies known secret names plus a pattern-based check, applied to every spawned child process (bwrap and fallback)
  • Configuration options: readonly paths, tmpfs setup, network isolation flag

Testing

  • 23 unit tests covering:
    • Availability detection (bwrap, seccomp)
    • Sandbox configuration
    • Command execution in sandbox
    • Filesystem isolation
    • Capability restrictions
    • Fallback behavior
    • Error handling
    • Environment variable filtering (new): asserts no secret-shaped env var reaches the bwrap child process or the unsandboxed fallback bash child process
  • All tests passing (both real bwrap sandboxing and fallback modes, depending on host)

Acceptance Criteria

  • OS-level sandboxing implemented with bwrap support (filesystem isolation)
  • Seccomp availability detection (enforcement not implemented — tracked separately if needed)
  • Graceful fallback to unsandboxed execution
  • Secrets stripped from the environment of sandboxed and fallback child processes
  • Comprehensive test suite (23 tests)
  • All tests passing
  • No breaking changes to existing functionality
  • Integration-ready for run_terminal tool

Test Plan

Run the unit tests:
```bash
pnpm run test:unit -- test/unit/safety/os-level-sandbox.test.ts
```

Expected: All 23 OSLevelSandbox tests pass, including the environment-variable-filtering tests.

Related Issues

Closes #69

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

hellodk and others added 4 commits July 16, 2026 23:00
Add real OS-level isolation for terminal command execution using Bubblewrap
(bwrap) and seccomp. Provides filesystem isolation, capability restrictions,
and network control without requiring root privileges.

Features:
- Detects bwrap and seccomp availability on Linux
- Executes commands in isolated filesystem with read-only system paths
- Mounts writable work directory for safe file operations
- Graceful fallback to unsandboxed execution when bwrap unavailable
- Timeout and output capture with configurable sandbox options
- Integration ready with existing CommandSandbox for defense-in-depth

Implementation:
- OSLevelSandbox class with async/Promise-based API
- Comprehensive test suite (26 test cases covering isolation, detection, errors)
- All tests passing with both real bwrap sandboxing and fallback modes
- Supports custom configuration for readonly paths and syscall restrictions

Implements issue #69: Real command sandboxing (seccomp/bwrap)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DLSvxucbfqMjup96KyKVyE
OSLevelSandbox was passing process.env unfiltered to both the bwrap
child process and the unsandboxed fallback bash process, leaking any
secret env vars (AWS keys, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY, DB
passwords, etc.) into commands executed on behalf of the agent.

Add filterSensitiveEnv(): strips an explicit denylist of known secret
names plus a pattern-based check (SECRET/TOKEN/API_KEY/ACCESS_KEY/
PRIVATE_KEY/PASSWORD/CREDENTIAL), applied in both executeWithBwrap and
executeUnsandboxed before spawning. Added failing-first TDD tests that
mock child_process.spawn to assert no secret-shaped env var reaches
either child process.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DLSvxucbfqMjup96KyKVyE
@hellodk
hellodk merged commit 675caf7 into master Jul 16, 2026
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Real command sandboxing

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